

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor/Directeurs:

Robert Burch	Roger A. Shiner	J. N. Kaufmann
Department of Philosophy	Department of Philosophy	Département de Philosophie
University of Alberta	University of Alberta	Université du Québec
Edmonton, Alberta	Edmonton, Alberta	à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Canada T6G 2E5	Canada T6G 2E5	Trois-Rivières, Québec
		Canada G9A 5H7

Managing Editor:

Steven Scott

Academic Printing and Publishing

The editors will consider for publication submitted reviews of publications that are strictly educational textbooks. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words in length, and should be sent to the appropriate editor.

Les éditeurs considéreront pour fin de publication des recensions d'ouvrages qui se présentent comme des manuels destinés à l'enseignement. Ces recensions ne doivent pas dépasser 1000 mots; elles devront être envoyées à l'éditeur respectif.

Subscription prices for a volume of ten issues:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Non-Canadian)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de dix numéros:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Hors-Canada)
Individuals: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Hors-Canada)
Etudiants: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing
P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1986 Academic Printing and Publishing

TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Vol. VI no. 7 September / septembre 1986

Peter Alexander, <i>Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles. Locke and Boyle on the External World</i> (E.J. Ashworth)	321
C. Fred Alford, <i>Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas</i> (James Stolzman)	326
David Best, <i>Feelings and Reason in the Arts</i> (Richard Eldridge)	329
Norman Daniels, <i>Just Health Care</i> (Brian Cupples)	332
Norma Haan, Elaine Aerts & Bruce A. B. Cooper, <i>On Moral Grounds: The Search for Practical Morality</i> (Robert E. Carter)	336
Martin Heidegger, <i>Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom</i> . Trans. Joan Stambaugh (Peter Preuss)	338
Anthony Kenny, <i>The Ivory Tower: Essays in Philosophy and Public Policy</i> (Conrad G. Brunk)	341
Oliver Leaman, <i>An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy</i> (R.G. Wengert)	343
Emmanuel Levinas, <i>Ethics and Infinity</i> (Wanda Teays)	346
Hugo A. Meynell, <i>The Nature of Aesthetic Value</i> (Virgil C. Aldrich)	348
H. A. Meynell, <i>Religion and Irreligion</i> (C.G. Prado)	350
Holmes Rolston, III, <i>Religious Inquiry — Participation and Detachment</i> (Harold Coward)	351
John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, <i>Foundations of Illocutionary Logic</i> (William K. Blackburn)	354
Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, <i>Personal Identity</i> (Albert Shalom)	357
Robert Sokolowski, <i>Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study</i> (Robert Hanna)	360
R. C. Stalnaker, <i>Inquiry</i> (Jonathan Dancy)	363

Mailed in October 1986.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Revue Canadienne de Philosophie

Editor: BRIAN ELLIS

ARTICLES

Jordan Howard Sobel

Notes on Decision Theory:
Old Wine in New Bottles

Philip Pettit and

Restrictive Consequentialism

Geoffrey Brennan

Group Minds

D.H.M. Brooks

The Inverted Spectrum

Bredo C. Johnsen

Donnellan's Distinctions

Rod Bertolet

Psychologism and Anti-Realism

Karen Green

DISCUSSION

Elizabeth Ring

Goldman's Reliability Theory of Justified Belief

Don Mannison

Another Failure for Cognitive Relativism

BOOKS RECEIVED, NOTES AND NEWS, INDEX

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: Individuals A\$17 (US\$18 or Stg£10); Institutions A\$34, (US\$36 or Stg£18). All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor or Business Manager, Department of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, 3083, Australia.

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY

THE AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PHILOSOPHY

The Journal of Philosophy

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Individuals	\$20.00
Libraries and institutions	\$25.00
Students, retired/unemployed philosophers	\$15.00
Postage outside U.S.	\$ 5.00

BACK VOLUMES

Published bi-monthly 1904-1976, monthly thereafter.

All back volumes and individual issues are available, also a Cumulative Fifty-year Index, 1904-1953 and a Ten-year Supplemental Index, 1954-1963. Back volumes 1976-present also available in microform.

Please inquire for price lists and shipping charges on back orders.

720 PHILOSOPHY HALL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NYC 10027

PETER ALEXANDER. *Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles. Locke and Boyle on the External World*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. 330. US\$44.50. ISBN 0-521-26707-2.

In recent years it has become fashionable to rehabilitate John Locke, to present him as a philosopher who is of interest in his own right and who should not be read through the eyes of Berkeley and Hume. Peter Alexander is one of the leaders in this movement; and the present book is a welcome development of the papers he has published since 1974. Alexander reads Locke within the framework of Robert Boyle's work; and he regards him as a popularizer of contemporary natural science who intended to explore its implications for our awareness of the world around us. Contrary to the popular view that Locke is slapdash and frequently confused, Alexander argues that the *Essay* contains a number of carefully worked out arguments using a gradually developed series of technical terms. In Part II of his book, Alexander develops these themes by means of detailed study of 11 topics, each of which involves a close analysis of Locke's actual words, indeed, of Locke's actual syntax.

As a preliminary to this analysis of Locke, Alexander has three chapters devoted to the writings of Robert Boyle. He emphasizes Boyle's fight against the occult qualities relied on by chemists and peripatetic philosophers, and shows how Boyle hoped to replace talk of principles, elements and forms by a description of the inner structure of objects which would have genuine explanatory value. Material things were seen as being made up of corpuscles which, unlike atoms, were indivisible in fact rather than in principle, and whose basic properties (shape, size and mobility, along with solidity as a non-differentiating characteristic) were of a kind met with in ordinary experience. These corpuscles formed textured structures in terms of which observable properties and events could be explained mechanically. Alexander notes that one of the corollaries of Boyle's rejection of occult properties was a disinclination to consider forces and action at a distance. This attitude was to have a profound effect upon Locke.

The first central Lockean theme that Alexander considers is Locke's use of the word 'idea.' He disposes fairly briskly of some of the usual criticisms. The fact that Locke uses the word in different senses does not mean that he has

confused those senses, for the context itself will nearly always show us what is meant. There is, he says, very little evidence that Locke used the word 'idea' with any frequency to mean 'mental image'; and no evidence at all that Locke took ideas as concepts to be mental images. He notes that Locke italicizes 'idea' throughout the *Essay* and he suggests that this is because 'idea' was a foreign word adopted self-consciously in order to escape at least part of the scholastic connotation of the word 'species.' The notion of sensible species represented a compromise between the material and the mental; whereas Locke wanted to distinguish sharply between the material corpuscles which convey patterns and the resulting ideas. However, at the same time, Alexander does want to claim that the word 'idea' may convey a sense of externality. He argues that Locke's central technical sense for the word 'idea' is 'percept,' what I have when I actually see or taste or touch or smell something. These percepts are, of course, mind-dependent but, according to Alexander, mind-dependence is not incompatible with spatial location. He writes: 'The distance from me of the redness I see is part of my perception of it. Now the appearances of individual qualities are simple ideas in Locke's sense. So there is a sense in which I can point at such ideas. They have a sort of minimal publicity...' (103). Not only that; ideas can also be described as having shape, or as being hard or soft. Alexander claims that this interpretation of Locke will allow the explanation of various otherwise puzzling passages. In particular, it will allow us to explain how it is that primary qualities resemble objects; and how it is that communication is possible between individuals. We can point to our ideas; and these ideas have at least some qualities in common with their objects.

Alexander's arguments are interesting, but I do not believe that they are faithful to Locke's text, nor that they are necessary to save Locke from difficulty. The main passage Alexander quotes to support his view (II.viii.12) includes the remark, 'the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance,' but there seems nothing in the passage to warrant the view that we may move from 'perceived at a distance' to 'the percepts are at a distance.' The sense of the passage as a whole seems to be that since *objects* are at a distance, we need some explanation of their ability to affect us. Furthermore, Alexander fails to discuss the crucial passage (II.xxi.15) in which Locke considers the possibility that two people may have different ideas when confronted with a marigold and a violet (one sees blue where the other sees yellow) and yet nonetheless use language to make exactly the same discriminations (both say 'Yellow' when they see a marigold). This passage makes it quite clear, I think, that for Locke the idea (percept) is private, and that what we point to, discuss, communicate about is something else. It seems to me that Locke is better interpreted in the following way: we are presented with a field of experience in which there are public objects. Upon reflection, we come to make a distinction between the objects as external to us, and our own awarenesses of these objects, even though it is by definition not possible to experience an object independently of our awarenesses. It is a mistake to objectify the latter in such a way as to ascribe spatial location or properties to them. To say that an object appears to me as elliptical and out

there is not to say that there is an appearance which is both elliptical and out there. Yet this is the very move to which Alexander is, mistakenly, committed.

Another place in which I disagree with some of the details of Alexander's argument is in his presentation of Locke's theory of secondary qualities. Alexander places this within the context of Boyle's corpuscularian hypothesis, and he argues, correctly, that for Locke secondary quality words such as 'red' name not secondary qualities but ideas of secondary qualities, or those percepts produced in us by the textures of external objects. Secondary qualities are just the textures, and these are neither observed directly nor named by us. Where I fail to follow Alexander is in his attempt to draw Locke's theory of signification into the picture by claiming that percepts are the primary or immediate significates of colour words, and that primary quality words such as 'extension' also name percepts as well as, in their case, qualities (172). There is a double confusion here, between Locke's epistemology and his theory of signification, and between signification and naming. Locke's epistemological thesis is that when I use a secondary quality word I pick out a percept and apply the word only by extension to the external object; whereas when I use a primary quality word I pick out a real quality of the external object. His theory of signification tells us that all words primarily signify (i.e. make known) the presence of some mental element, a concept or thought, but that they also make known, secondarily and mediately, some referent. In the case of secondary quality words this referent — the thing named — is also mental; in the case of primary quality words, it is not.

Among the interpretations of Locke which Alexander puts forward, two others are particularly worthy of mention; namely, his treatment of powers and of substance. He argues that for Locke powers are epistemologically relational and non-intrinsic, but that ontologically they are intrinsic properties of bodies, to be identified with textures. He supports this view by reference to Locke's rejection of occult forces, which would preclude him from interpreting a power as something over and above matter in motion, and by appeal to Locke's view of real essences. If we knew a real essence, we would know the necessary connections between textures and their effects without having to examine those effects, or to experiment on other bodies. We would know *a priori* that rhubarb would purge, simply by examining the basic corpuscular textures found in that plant. Thus, the power to purge is correctly described as a secondary quality of rhubarb.

With respect to substance, Alexander argues that Locke believes substance-in-general to be logically necessary as a support for qualities, and that we can achieve a clearer idea of it than we initially suppose. Material substance turns out to be matter as a solid stuff which must, as solid, have the features of shape and size; and which cannot therefore exist independently of these features. Spiritual substance is characterized by perceptivity, the passive capacity to receive perceptions and the active capacity to think. Throughout these passages, as elsewhere, Alexander's claims are carefully documented, clearly argued, and convincing.

In this review I have not been able to do more than sketch the riches to

be found in Alexander's book. It is not light reading, because Alexander sticks resolutely to the text, and there are few wider philosophical excursions. Moreover, some chapters, especially that on knowledge, contain a little too much narrative. But these are only minor reservations. In general, the book is an extremely interesting and valuable contribution to our understanding of Locke, which should serve as a focal point for all subsequent discussion.

E.J. ASHWORTH

University of Waterloo

C. FRED ALFORD. *Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida 1985. Pp. xi + 226. US\$24.50. ISBN 0-8130-0817-4.

That the epistemological and political status of science has long been a central concern of critical theory is widely known, yet remarkably few studies exist which testify to this fact. It is to Alford's credit, therefore, that his is the first attempt in English to address this issue in detail. Alford's choice of subject-matter is in perfect keeping with this goal. Marcuse and Habermas are usually regarded as occupying the most extreme positions within the critical camp, but for reasons which, as Alford points out, are largely mistaken.

Marcuse is often depicted as espousing a nature-romanticism in which the overcoming of nature through instrumental manipulation would be superseded by an erotic relationship. Such an aesthetic, non-domineering receptivity toward nature would form the basis for a new science, radically distinct from that associated with technology. Habermas, by contrast, criticizes such a proposal on the grounds that it would mark a retreat from the rational disenchantment of nature wrought by the Enlightenment. For him, the instrumental nature of experimental science is not a mere historical fact, but is embedded a priori in human nature as such.

This way of posing the issue, Alford contends, is only partially correct. In order to understand why, one must turn to Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where the problem of science emerges with full force. The realization of individual autonomy already implicit in Homeric myth, so it is argued, presupposes the instrumental domination of external and internal nature. The rational repression of instincts, however, leads to irrational aggression and authoritarianism.

This dialectic is also latent in Marcuse's early postulation of an existential rupture with nature. Lack of self-sufficiency and natural scarcity require setting aside free play and imagination for labor, which forces the self to conform to the laws of nature. In *Eros and Civilization* the instrumental repression of erotic drives is said to issue in a weakening of sociality, thereby unleashing the forces of death and destruction as exemplified in war and technology. Only by overcoming natural scarcity and, therewith, the necessity to labor, can this dialectic be avoided.

Alford mentions three strategies pursued by Marcuse to implement this regime: instrumental domination of nature leading to total automation; the ontological transformation of nature in harmony with our own erotic nature; and the development of a new science guided by the erotic potential already implicit in nature (47). Alford is unclear about how these strategies are related, linking the second with both the first and third alternatives. Nevertheless, he emphatically asserts that, given the incompatibility of the third option (the new science) with Marcuse's preference for freedom over passive reconciliation with nature, the first option is the dominant one in his thought. Thus, contrary to accepted opinion, Alford concludes that Marcuse's 'gay science' is ideological rhetoric intended to mask the harsh subordination of nature to human purposes necessary for total automation (64). Ultimately, even this latter option is abandoned in Marcuse's later writings on aesthetics and late capitalism, which suggest that reconciliation is a desideratum that may never be achieved.

Habermas seeks to avoid the dialectic of enlightenment in an altogether different manner; namely, by postulating a distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality. Rational autonomy and identity are premised on mutual recognition in communication, which in turn presupposes ideal conditions of argumentative discourse, reciprocity and freedom from internal and external constraint. On this reading, the dialectic of enlightenment is not an inevitable outgrowth of rationalization per se, but of a onesided process of social development, inherent in the dynamics of capitalism, which subordinates contexts of communicative action to contexts of strategic action governed exclusively by instrumental rationality. By grounding natural and hermeneutic sciences in distinct action spheres governed by quasi-transcendental interests in instrumental domination and mutual understanding necessary for survival, Habermas justifies a positive role for natural science while limiting its valid deployment to extrasocietal contexts. This strategy enables him to develop his own version of a new 'reconstructive' science that describes the essential, universal conditions underlying communicative interaction and situates them within a theory of social evolution.

The upshot of Alford's study is that Marcuse requires the completion of the scientific project of enlightenment in order to bring about a happy state in which the sort of rational discourse prized by Habermas will be rendered unnecessary. Habermas expects much less of science: since the elimination of scarcity through total automation and systematic organization is considered to be both dangerous and impossible, he prefers a balanced society combining

the virtues of social democracy and rational administration (176). Despite its contradictions, Marcuse's proposal for a new science which transcends categorical distinctions between instrumental and communicative action is seen by Alford as a possible alternative for the future. Yet, notwithstanding its tendency to erect categorical barriers which frustrate the imaginative growth of science, Habermas' analysis is regarded as a more accurate and rigorous description of science in its present state (171).

Alford is to be commended on his judicious treatment of the subject matter and his thorough analysis of texts, which show a deep understanding of both critical theory and philosophy of science. His dense style, however, is not always conducive to the aims of the reader. There are problems of substance as well. Although Habermas is wary of social engineering, he does not deny the valid deployment of nomothetic science in the social sphere, as Alford seems to think. Indeed, his own theory, which relies upon psychoanalytic and functionalist models, seems to presuppose such a deployment in combination with hermeneutic methods. A purely behavioral science may not be able to explain action, but it can uncover regularities that may be useful for purposes of social engineering once the ends to be pursued are democratically established. Alford also fails to discuss the complex interweaving of hermeneutical, logical, and empirical themes in Habermas' recent characterization of rational reconstruction. Finally, the divisions which Alford and others have found so intolerable in Habermas' philosophy have been partially mitigated by his recent attempt to incorporate an extended notion of aesthetic rationality into his system — an important development apparently postdating Alford's otherwise worthy contribution.

DAVID INGRAM

University of Northern Iowa

ROBERT J. ANTONIO and RONALD M. GLASSMAN, eds. *A Weber-Marx Dialogue*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1985. Pp. xxi + 334. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0265-8.

This book is a collection of fourteen essays dealing with various aspects of the relationship between the social theories of Max Weber and Karl Marx. Twelve of the essays are published here for the first time and the other two are translations of articles that originally appeared in German. The contributors include

a number of eminent Weber scholars in history, sociology, political science, and philosophy. Most of the essays were initially presented at either special Weber colloquia or sessions on Weber at meetings of different learned societies. The extent to which the contributors acknowledge each other's work and assistance suggests that they constitute something of an intellectual network.

A notable feature of the book's format is its reversal of the usual figure-ground relation in treating the ideas of Marx and Weber. This is to say, issues in Marxist thought are viewed against a Weberian backdrop. However, this fresh approach was not intended to denote a judgment about the relative importance of the two theorists. I think it was rather the case that the customary treatment of Weber's work as representing a debate with the 'ghost of Marx' has become too closely associated with a view that both exaggerates the points of divergence and underestimates the areas of agreement between the two men. Indeed, a unifying theme of this collection is a more or less concerted effort by the individual authors to challenge interpretations, arising from both Marxist and Weberian circles, that have served to perpetuate this misleading view.

The volume opens with a short (ten page) but helpful introduction by the editors. The contributed essays are grouped together under the following general headings: The Limits of the Dialogue; Theory; Method; History; and Politics. Space does not permit a full inventory of the book's contents. A sampling of the topics covered — namely, a history of scholarly analyses of the Marx-Weber relationship, Weber's relation to critical Marxism, the reception of Weber's work in Eastern Europe, the relevance of Marx and Weber to understanding contemporary American society, and the role of ideal interests in Weber's sociology — will have to suffice. Some of the better known contributors to the volume are Franco Ferrarotti, Douglas Kellner, Wolfgang Mommsen, Guenther Roth, and Johannes Weiss.

According to the editors, their aim in publishing these essays was not only to counter the aforementioned dubious interpretations of the Weber-Marx relationship, but to employ the latter as a vehicle to 'stimulate ideas and questions that will foster social and political dialogue about pressing social issues' (xx). My assessment would be that by these criteria the project must be regarded as successful on both counts. Without glossing over the genuine theoretical, philosophical, and political differences between Marx and Weber, most of the authors persuasively give lie to the caricature of Weber as an idealist who was fundamentally opposed to Marx's materialist conception of society and history. Likewise, several of the essays reveal how the complexity and ambivalence of Weber's attitude toward capitalism has been obscured by the effort to paint him as a thoroughgoing anti-Marxist. Albeit from different angles, the papers by Mommsen, Ferrarotti, Stephen Turner and Robert Antonio all underscore the distortions engendered by such a misreading of Weber's theoretical position. This collection also effectively demonstrates that the points of contention between Marx and Weber generally revolve around issues that remain very much alive today. More specifically, several of the authors indicate how the

intellectual and political concerns that animated these classical theorists are of continuing relevance for understanding the nature and development of both corporate capitalist and state socialist societies in the present era.

On the other hand, this volume is not without certain shortcomings. As with any multi-authored project, a certain amount of unevenness is probably inevitable. In the present instance I found this to be less a problem with regard to matters of substance than of literary style. In short, while many of the essays are written in a clear and incisive prose that makes for pleasurable reading, a lesser but significant number of the papers suffer from an abstruse mode of expression that is at best taxing and at worst repugnant. The book's overall coherence might also have been enhanced by a concluding chapter that revisits and amplifies the discussion contained in the editors' excellent introductory comments. In the absence of such a chapter, a degree of closure may be obtained by re-reading the introduction after one has read the main body of the text.

Finally, allow me to conclude with an admittedly gratuitous observation. This volume supplies more than ample evidence testifying to the fruitfulness of the renewed interest in Marx and Weber scholarship. That is to say, the rightfulness of Marx' and Weber's standing as seminal contributors to classical social theory has been augmented by this renaissance. Speaking as a student and teacher of sociological theory, my only serious misgiving with this definition of things is that it implicitly relegates all other theorists to a secondary status in the dialogue. In particular, it has the effect of 'demoting' Emile Durkheim from his customary place alongside Marx and Weber as the three thinkers who have contributed most to establishing the basic framework of modern sociology. As a seconder of this opinion, I would cite Randall Collins' recent (1985) *Three Sociological Traditions*. Collins makes a rather compelling case that some of Durkheim's ideas can usefully be applied to address deficiencies in the 'conflict tradition' of sociological analysis represented by Marx and Weber. What is more, Collins argues that Durkheim's work also helps to bridge the macro-historical perspective of these thinkers to the whole 'micro-interactionist' tradition of Cooley, Mead, *et al.* In my judgment, these are more than sufficient grounds for insisting upon the centrality of Durkheim in the ongoing dialogue about the nature and problems of modern society.

JAMES STOLZMAN

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology
Dalhousie University

DAVID BEST. *Feeling and Reason in the Arts*. Winchester, MA: George Allen & Unwin 1985. Pp. viii + 200. US\$28.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-04-370156-6); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-04-370157-4).

Beginning from a Wittgensteinian standpoint concerning mind, language, practices, and philosophy, Best's 'central concern' is with the rational justifiability of judgments that particular things are art (viii). This issue is to be distinguished from that of the rational justification of the practices of making and responding to art, which are simply natural in human life. Certain 'instinctive responses' and 'non-rational ways of behaving and responding are the roots of the concept of art ... [and] give sense to the reasons used in discussion of the arts' (5). While artworks can extend and reshape our responses, so that some responses to works are natural chiefly in the sense of customary, the very possibility of developing customs of production and response presupposes responses that are 'immediate, primitive, and natural' (180). These primitive responses are simply ours, without justification; our capacity of responses as a whole 'rests on nothing' (180).

Reasons for judgments that particular things are art are hence internal to these natural responses. Criticism properly focuses our attention on a work, displaying it as something to be cared about, either primitively or against the background of developed media of art that have built on our natural propensities of response. Critical arguments are essentially interpretive and comparative. They offer us 'assessment without measurement,' or interpretation of a work as something to be responded to without an external standard of response (17). The knowledge critics have of works might usefully be compared to the generally narrative, historical, and comparative knowledge each of us has of some other persons as proper objects of particular care and response. Disagreements about some particular artistic judgments are to be expected, as people may to some extent have contrasting senses of relevant comparisons and the degrees of support they provide for judgments. But only to some extent: our most basic instinctive responses are shared, and disagreement about particular judgments implies objectivism about art (46-7).

Works of art express and explore emotional feelings. This is natural to them. It requires no more explanation than does the inexplicable and undeniable fact that emotions are expressed by faces (109). 'An emotional feeling' is further 'a mode of apprehending an object,' whether a work or any other thing (118). In particular (here I render the point more explicitly than Best does or might wish to), there is a feeling on the part of an audience of absorption or 'involvement' (183) that is relevant to whether a thing is art — roughly the feeling that the work's expression and exploration of feeling are sincere and genuine, not self-indulgent or pandering. (Best might prefer to say that we simply find ourselves involved with certain works, apart from feeling; I am not sure.) Leavis' account of Hardy's sincerity in 'After A Journey' illustrates our involvement with a genuine work of art (189-90).

Neither the expression of feeling nor feeling in response can be explained

causally. Artists are not simply caused to express by given feelings, and audiences are not simply caused to respond by given formal features of a work. Rather, 'the development of expressive and responsive capacities [in going systems of art founded on basic given capacities of response] requires the development of critical abilities' to understand and employ a language or medium of art (137). 'Consequently, the given, that is, that which ultimately gives sense to reason and explanation, is language and the forms of art' (111).

Our involvement with a work and our feeling that it is genuine and valuable are directed to its particularity in rendering an emotion or conception, that is, to the fact that '*what* is expressed [cannot] be comprehensively characterized apart from the particular *way* in which it is expressed' (167). Hence whether it is appropriate to be absorbed or involved in a given work is rationally assessable, though not externally measurable, through the production of critical descriptions of the work that reveal to what extent it possesses this sort of particularity.

Given the perennial openness of our world to change, hence the openness of our feelings about it to change, and hence the openness to change of the media of expression, art has no fixed nature (50). 'Art' cannot be defined 'in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions' (52). Nonetheless, that a work is in a medium in which there is 'the possibility of the expression of a conception of life issues' (159) and that it is particular in the sense given above (166-7) are distinctly necessary though not jointly sufficient conditions of its being art.

The distinctive value of art is that it enables us to learn through feeling to experience feelings that are reflective of general attitudes toward the world (183-92). The experience of art hence produces a kind of nonpropositional knowledge of ourselves in relation to our world, for example the sort of knowledge that Lear acquires, and that we may acquire through him, of what it feels like to be poor (183-4). Any propositions about this would be trivial. In confronting *King Lear*, the important thing is that we are offered 'an emotional experience which casts a new light on a situation, revealing what the analogous life situation amounts to' (184). Thus art is neither 'opaque' to life, with its value utterly autonomous from and uninformative about life, nor 'transparent' to life in merely presenting true propositions about it; rather it is 'translucent' in helping us 'to see [a] situation in [its] light,' in all its detail and phenomenology (174-5).

I believe Best has accurately described the logic of criticism and the role of feelings in expression and response. He has said some important and suggestive things about the value of art. These are important achievements. I am left, however, with the following reservations.

1) Best seems to me to have confused the true claims that art has no external justification, that it is rooted in certain natural responses of absorption and involvement, and that the structure and nature of our response to art cannot be justified with the (I think) false claim that art cannot be defined. In particular, though it cannot be *justified*, the structure and nature of artistic response can be *analyzed* as involving other modes of response — especially cognition, including the experiences of challenges to it and of its extension, and feeling

pleasure. I see no reason why art cannot be defined along generally Kantian lines as providing pleasure in challenging and extending our cognitive capacities. Such a definition both allows for ongoing changes within and of the media of art and is consistent with much of what Best says about its basis and value.

2) Best fails to work out the descriptive philosophical psychology that is required to uphold his argument against relativism about art. He notes that the fact that we use the term 'art' to describe certain artifacts produced within other cultures shows that 'art' must have a core of objective meaning. 'If it were asserted that the concept of art in another society was *nothing* like ours, then the assertion would be meaningless,' for without relevant likenesses nothing could justify us in using 'art' to describe their products (51). Best is right to note the incoherence of radically relativist uses of 'art.' But this incoherence does not count against those who would happily abandon the word altogether in order to talk of society or class based preferences for various things that have no common nature. Claims that 'art' ought not to be used are a common theme in the writings of so-called post-modernist relativists. In order to answer them, what is required is a demonstration that something in our psychology or nature leads persons in various cultures to produce and value things properly classifiable as art. Here too some attention to Kant's psychology and theory of taste might be helpful. It is a virtue of Best's that he has suggested that responses to art have a family resemblance to responses to pretending, clapping games, nursery rhymes, being told stories, and so on — activities such that it is nearly impossible to imagine a society of persons in which all of them were absent (6-7). Here is a beginning, but only a beginning, of the required psychology.

3) That a work is particular in Best's sense of admitting no distinction between what is expressed and how it is expressed seems to do nearly all the work in certifying it as art (and Best's talk of being in a medium of a certain kind seems to be beside the point). That is, that a work is particular in this sense seems to me to be necessary and sufficient for its being art. (Why we do and should care about such things, and how we may recognize them through feeling are of course further questions.) Engineered objects and phenomena such as airplanes, kettles, and interior decors do not constitute the counterexamples to this claim that Best takes them to be (156), for we can specify their use, function, or (loosely) expressive content independently of specifying their particular form. For any object of use, there might be another — though perhaps less elegant and more costly — that does the same job. So far as I can tell, this is uniquely not true of all works of art, so that particularity in Best's sense is necessary and sufficient for art. This stance has the further virtue of readily accommodating as art both nonrepresentational music and abstract painting, both of which, Best concedes, come out as art rather too marginally on his account (167).

Despite these objections, *Feeling and Reason in the Arts* is an important new work that comes as close as any to locating the roots of art accurately

in natural human responses, to characterizing the nature of specifically artistic expression, and to identifying the value of art.

RICHARD ELDRIDGE
Swarthmore College

NORMAN DANIELS. *Just Health Care*. New York, Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 245. US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-23608-8); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31794-0).

Daniels develops an account of distributive justice for the health care setting and applies that account to some issues that provide a test, as well as illustrate the limits of, that account. The position developed is well argued and deserves the close attention of decision-makers in the health policy fields. And while he takes some perceived inequalities in the American health care system as his point of departure — for example, he notes that 25 million Americans have no health care insurance, that an additional 20 million are inadequately covered, and that inequalities in the United States to access to personal medical services are correlated with class and race (3) — the account he develops is of much more general interest.

The first three chapters are devoted to arguments of a theoretical nature, wherein Daniels lays out his account of distributive justice, which he calls the 'fair equality of opportunity' account. This account is then applied to questions of equity of access to health care (chapter four), rationing resources according to age (chapter five), doing justice to providers (chapter six), imposition of occupational safety standards (chapter seven), and assumptions of risk in the workplace (chapter eight). The book concludes with a ninth chapter concerning philosophy and public policy.

The account that is developed does not pretend to provide a complete foundation for a theory of distributive justice. Rather Daniels wants to make the following conditional plausible: if there is a social obligation to protect fair equality of opportunity, then health-care institutions should be designed to meet that obligation. Daniels presents reasons in support of the antecedent of this conditional and explores some implications of this fair equality of opportunity account. One implication is that 'there is a social obligation to guarantee equitable access to a broad array of medical and other health-care services. Specifically, this means that various kinds of primary and other acute care must

be available to people who need it, regardless of geographical location or ability to pay' (114).

Daniels' other discussions of what fair equality demands are of interest in their own right quite apart from his own specific conclusions. That is, he typically contrasts his own account with other positions in the literature and these criticisms are insightful and valuable in themselves. For example, in the chapter on equity of access to health care Daniels discusses three approaches from the health policy literature to defining equality of access, argues that these three approaches are really disguised ways of talking about distributive justice, and contrasts them with his approach.

The fair equality of opportunity account is developed in two stages. The first stage (chapter two) explains why health care needs are viewed as special: they are so because meeting them helps to maintain 'normal species functioning.' If normal species functioning is compromised, by disease or disability, then an individual may not receive the share of the 'normal opportunity range for his society' he otherwise would have.

The second stage (chapter three) is an argument to provide normative foundations for the explanation given at stage one. Daniels does not provide a full theoretical justification for a principle that guarantees full equality of opportunity. However, he does try to show that one general theory of justice, that of Rawls, can be extended to health-care institutions. The idea here is that, while Rawls' principle protects individual shares in access to jobs and offices, it can be extended to include the protection of individual shares of the normal opportunity range (57).

Those interested in the foundations of a theory of justice will no doubt wish to consider more closely the extension of Rawls' principle that Daniels proposes. An essay which is indispensable in this regard is that of Leon Ellsworth ('Decision-Theoretic Analysis of Rawls' Original Position,' in C.A. Hooker, et al., *Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory*. Vol. II. D. Reidel Pub. Co. 1978, 29-45). Those less interested in foundational questions will find the use which Daniels makes of his account of fair equality of opportunity an important contribution.

BRIAN CUPPLES
University of New Brunswick

ARTHUR C. DANTO. *Narration and Knowledge*. New York: Columbia University Press 1985. Pp. xvii + 399. US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-06116-1); US\$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-06117-X).

This volume incorporates a reprint of the author's *Analytic Philosophy of History* (1964) in its entirety, comprising twelve chapters. Three chapters are added, each a paper that extends the argument of the earlier book and has seen subsequent publication elsewhere. It will be useful to review the main points of the older work before going on to the newer chapters.

Danto was inspired by some of the then recent developments in the philosophy of science; and, indirectly, his subsequent work in aesthetics displays the same influence. He cites N.R. Hanson and Thomas Kuhn as the leaders in the revolution against the received neopositivistic view of science. Hanson effectively argued that observation is always interpenetrated with theory and Kuhn revealed that scientific theory, if we are to understand it in any deep philosophical way, cannot be divorced from its history.

So, for history as a study, Danto argues that there are no simple objects of observation: past events are isolated, described and even identified in some framework of significance. There is no such thing as pure chronicle which, like the putative pure observation, would tell us without regard for its place in the flow of history simply what has occurred. For Danto the past event is always seen under an historical description which is given by the historian, who is always looking back from the future and picking out the subject matter as well as describing it in a way that no contemporary could possibly have done. We can say that the Thirty Years' War began in 1618, but certainly no one in 1618 could have made such a statement. Thus for Danto there is an intentionality by which the future formulates the past in historical writing. He develops the consequences of this notion in a consistent and thoroughgoing way.

The historian tells a story, for instance one about the Thirty Years' War. A story has a beginning, middle, and end with the earlier stages being given significance by the later ones. The narrator cannot even begin the tale unless she has some idea of what story she is telling. This diachronic, backward looking is necessary to the historical perspective for Danto, and his deep sense of this is the source for his developed philosophy of history.

The last three chapters, the newer material, provide a capstone to the earlier work. Whereas that book is a careful, exhaustive argument forged through criticism of the proposals of C.G. Hempel, C.I. Lewis, Charles Beard, W.H. Walsh et. al., Danto, in the first two of the added papers, applies his theory in new ways.

In 'Historical Understanding' he asks the question of whether we can have an internal understanding, a *Verstehen* of past periods. He answers no. The argument is based upon a characterization of narrative sentences. To immerse ourselves in the world of the past epoch, to understand it in the sense of *Verstehen*, means that we must forget the subsequent record, something that we cannot do. In narrating the past we tell a story and invest the events with an

unavoidable significance. *Versteben* can only carry us into another form of life similar to our own, but we cannot imaginatively live a significantly different one. From his example of the spinning wheel there seem two kinds of reasons why we cannot achieve a view of that artifact as it was held in the mid-eighteenth century. First, we live in a culture that does not use the instrument with its attendant institutions and practices of the previous time. Secondly, and more importantly for his thesis, we have an unavoidable future position to that past era, when the spinning wheel was employed in its original use. The unerasable knowledge that we have of the subsequent industrialization of textile manufacture prevents us from naturalizing ourselves into that previous form of life.

In 'Historical Language and Historical Reality,' Danto sketches a general difference between philosophy and science. He regards the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* as having the profound insight that philosophy's concern is not with reality as such — that's the province of science — but with the relationship of language to the world. This places philosophy in an extraworldly position producing not truths but an understanding of how we talk about reality. Thus the concepts of truth, existence, representation, and reality are not descriptive of the way things are but of how we symbolize the world. The philosophical endeavor is semantical and extraworldly, whereas science in its various complex ways, which we may very generally call causal, represents and maps reality. Science is thus in a intraworldly as contrasted to the extraworldly relation to what is. These two uses of language, the natural and the semantical, are for Danto often confused and thus give rise to endless and fruitless debates so familiar to us from the history of philosophy. He applies this analysis to a variety of topics. One will suffice to illustrate his thought here.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth, despite its inadequacies in various formulations, embodies the right insight for Danto. The philosophical treatment of truth must stick with the relation of language to the world. William James was unhappy with depriving true statements of doing any work *in* the world, of changing reality. So for him the pragmatist must see true statements as successful, granting satisfaction, and a theory of truth as concerned with how we get on *in* the world. A philosophical theory becomes operative in our lives, ignoring its essentially semantical function. Such misapplication of philosophy resulted in a 'redesign of language, truth, and reality' which in major parts did not work. This disrespect for the different categorical functions of the extra- and intraworldly uses of language is found in the traditional disputes over the issues of relativism, historicism and *Versteben*.

The final short chapter, from which the new book takes its name, provides the reader with a quick look at the central point of the full theory, namely that narrative informs past historical fact with what was future to that fact. The contemporary cannot know the history of his own time. Nor is a history of the future logically possible. This is a theme touched upon in the earlier work but further developed here. The argument goes as follows. To write the history of a future event, *e*, we would have to know that *e* will occur; to know that *e* will occur implies that *e* will occur *no matter what happens now*. Thus

the present is divorced from furnishing reasons for *e*. But furnishing reasons is exactly what historical narrative does, for it ties diachronic events together into a semantical whole. Therefore, a history of the future is not possible. This conclusion has a broad significance, for it again shows the necessary asymmetry of historical narrative. An event can be described historically only from its future.

The publication of Danto's expanded philosophy of history in the present volume is again evidence for his being in the premier rank of philosophers in our time. After more than twenty years the text of the earlier work remains clear, forceful and imaginative. The subsequent added papers make perhaps the finest philosophy of history in the Anglo-American tradition truly magisterial.

JAY E. BACHRACH
Central Washington University

NORMA HAAN, ELAINE AERTS, & BRUCE A.B. COOPER. *On Moral Grounds: The Search for Practical Morality*. New York: New York University Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 439. US\$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8147-3426-x).

The authors of *On Moral Grounds* make clear at the outset that their inquiry into morality concerns itself with how social science can investigate morality. As though to make the task manageable, they candidly state 'that the only morality social scientists can properly seek is practical morality, that is, the morality people actually use' (1). This move is likely to be viewed as a contentious one by philosophers, whose concerns tend to lie with which morality people *ought* to use. Nevertheless, if there is no confusion of the one task with the other, there is only benefit to be derived from a clarification of how people do evaluate and decide morally. The confusion is not wholly absent, however.

The plan of the book is to compare Lawrence Kohlberg's *cognitive-developmental* theory of moral development with Norma Haan's *interactional* theory (with an occasional excursion into the social-learning theory). Kohlberg describes six (or seven) distinctive stages of moral development, and claims to have longitudinal and inter- or cross-cultural evidence for these stages, and for the irreversibility of moral development. Haan et al. present strong empirical evidence to counter Kohlberg's claims. Indeed, the results point to a gradual, non-stage conclusion. Moral skills develop gradually through practice, as chil-

dren (and adults) become more adept at dealing with moral conflicts, usually actual, as they arise. What is particularly interesting is that the research findings confirm the gradual interpretation in that children develop 'increasing skill in resolving moral conflict,' and not necessarily in coming to understand 'the fundamental conflict between self and other interest' (60). Given this focus, whether forced by the evidence or imposed as a research choice, it begins to become more evident that Haan and Kohlberg have very different theoretical starting points. Kohlberg wants to confirm a logical and normative ordering of moral development, and Haan and associates wish to establish that actual moral practice seeks to work out social arrangements that equalize human relations. Still, to assume that morality has as its task first and foremost the settling of moral disagreement does seem to cycle back to ethical emotivism. Charles Stevenson, in *Ethics and Language*, was as clear as anyone has been in philosophy that ethics is nothing more than factual and emotive attempts to settle disagreements. He, like Haan, turned to how people actually do resolve moral disagreement, and he took his philosophical knocks for not sufficiently attending to whether it was enough so to do, instead of evaluating the logicality, or rationality, or the relative value of the settlement reached as against other traditional or possible alternative settlements. In fact, it was argued that it was sometimes better not to resolve disagreement at all, but to leave it in place because of principle, or a sense of justice, or some other value preferentiality which one could not (morally) give up.

What *On Moral Grounds* does do very well indeed is to challenge Kohlberg's one-sided emphasis on reasoning and justice. Heavy emphasis is placed on the importance of emotion in moral decision making. Insofar as dialogical interaction is an essential feature of the interactional view, it is no surprise, but rather a bit of first-rate analysis that allows the authors to conclude that 'Emotions are almost always part of dialogue' (68), and that motivation is important as well (39). In Kohlberg's work, there is a clear appeal to John Rawls' conclusions about justice as the central issue of ethics, and to the deontological position in moral theory as the 'more advanced.' Haan et al. conclude that morality is heavily situational, and must often vary in conclusion depending on the content and the individuals involved. Kohlberg makes of morality a reasoning process primarily, while Haan thinks of morality as action. One acts in a specific situation, having created a solution jointly with others, in social interaction. Kohlberg and Haan both take on Moore's naturalistic fallacy, and while Kohlberg tries to deal with it by showing that his empirical evidence runs parallel to his normative conclusions about what ought to be, Haan simply admits that one must commit the fallacy, whether social scientist or philosopher. The naturalistic fallacy is a 'naturalistic necessity' (24), and the normative position which one adopts is to be 'a tentative, working formulation of moral grounds that is forever open to revision, refinement, or abandonment' (44).

If morality is a human construction, and if morality is something that one learns to engage in by resolving conflicts which arise between one's own interests and those of others, and if all investigation is value-laden in that there

is always 'a commitment to a core value' (2), then it is never enough to simply state what core values people assume in their resolution of moral conflicts. Put more simply, while one may well benefit from being situational and interactional in practice and attitude, one still has to choose one's valuational starting-point, and to establish one's order of value preference. To do this is to ask again the age-old questions which have come to form the history of philosophy. Kohlberg falls within this long-standing tradition, for he is a philosophically oriented psychologist. Kohlberg wants to know which way of settling moral disagreements is intrinsically better than another. Haan assumes that we *have* our value ground, whatever it is, and then set about using it in moral decision making as action. One suspects that there is a way of having both the normative evaluation of grounds, and the everyday activity through which we resolve conflicts at rest in a single theory.

Haan and associates have written a book which will contribute much to the practical understanding of how we *are* moral in the world. It challenges any and all absolutistic positions, and makes evident that morality is a social phenomenon, as well as a theoretical undertaking. It does not supplant Kohlberg, or ethical theory, but it does gnaw effectively at several of its tattered edges and at its complacent aloofness.

ROBERT E. CARTER
Trent University

MARTIN HEIDEGGER. *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 1985. Pp. 195. US\$26.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8214-0690-6); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8214-0691-4).

Schelling published his first book when he was nineteen years old. After a preternaturally productive career he published his last book in 1809, when he was thirty-four. This book, the *Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger considered Schelling's greatest and the best book of German Idealism. It is an attempt to write a system of freedom. Freedom is understood as the capacity for good and evil, and since the possibility of evil is therefore a presupposition of freedom, the book is also a metaphysics of evil.

Schelling's book, though well written, is not easy. Heidegger notes that in this book we reach the limit of the intelligible and there, in full clarity, encounter the unintelligible. But in the course of our journey to our encounter

with the unintelligible we are given insight ‘into the abysses and heights of Being, ... the terrible element of the godhead, the life dread of all creatures, the sadness of all created creators, the malice of evil and the will of love’ (164). It is philosophy in the grand style.

In 1936 Heidegger lectured on Schelling’s book at Freiburg. It is those lectures which Joan Stambaugh has translated. In these lectures Heidegger develops an interpretation of Schelling which, as one would expect, is enormously thoughtful, idiosyncratic in the sense of bearing the stamp of Heidegger’s originality as much or more than Schelling’s, and in many places more difficult, more obscure, than the work being interpreted. Heidegger is aware of this, but also thinks that this is as it should be. This is because philosophy is not just a form of the easily accessible, effortlessly intelligible talk of ordinary life. The first step of philosophy is the overcoming of coming sense (81), the second is to let go the apron strings of common logic (105) and the third is to think at a higher level of rigour and sincerity, to think truly, to think poetically (113). All of this is vintage post-*Being and Time* Heidegger, and very much worth looking at.

To embark on a translation of a book by Heidegger is like agreeing to board a troop of actors for the duration of their engagement at the local theatre. You know it’s going to be rough. But it’s also going to be more fun and more worth doing than hosting the Board of Governors. Fortunately, Joan Stambaugh has done this before, and her experience shows especially in the difficult passages where she is at her best. Some of Heidegger’s central passages are variations on a core word which are so difficult to translate because their effectiveness is less their meaning in any ordinary sense than a kind of incantatory charm which the transformation and reappearance of a core word seems to have. For example: ‘Das System ist die wissensmäßige Fügung des Gefüges und der Fug des Seins selbst.’ The translation is: ‘System is the conscious joining of the jointure and coherence of Being itself.’ Good show! ‘Gefüge’ is translated throughout as ‘jointure’ except on p. 63 it becomes ‘structure.’ Why? And while we’re on p. 63, look at: ‘Seyn als entfaltetes Gefüge und gefügter Fug und das Wissen des Seyns — ist dasselbe, sie gehören zusammen.’ The translation is: ‘As developed jointure and a joined connection, Being and the knowledge of Being are the same, they belong together.’ Well done! ‘Unfolded’ might have been better than ‘developed,’ but that is a trivium.

Working with heady stuff like that shouldn’t make one disdainful of the ordinary. I’m afraid this has happened here, however, and there are too many small mistakes. For example: ‘Each year of this span of fifteen years brings one or more treatises and in between such decisive works as ...’ (3); ‘dazwischen’ should not be translated ‘in between’ here but ‘among them.’ On p. 5 ‘Städtchen’ is translated as ‘city’; that’s too much. Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre* is standardly translated as *Science of Knowledge* and treated as a title, rather than ‘doctrine of science.’ On p. 6 ‘erhalten’ does not mean ‘maintain’ but ‘receive.’ On p. 12 ‘for Jena’ should read ‘from Jena.’ And so on. I cannot list them all here. But to be fair I should point out that the density of trivial mistakes decreases as we go further into the book.

There are a few other less serious translation problems which deserve mention. The word pattern on p. 51 is defective and fails to illustrate the point of the original. It reappears on p. 65 where it is improved a little, but this time the accompanying sentence is omitted. On p. 80 there is a passage from a little known essay by Hegel in which a peddler woman (why does she become a peddler's wife in the translation?) makes a nasty remark in response to a shopper's calling her eggs rotten. She says: 'Sie mag mir faul sein!' 'Sie' refers to the shopper, not to the eggs. So instead of 'Let them be rotten!' you get 'She's probably rotten!' or something like that. And in the same passage 'she buys a whole shirt' should read 'let her get a whole shirt.' There aren't only trivial mistakes, of course. There are also trivial gems. To translate 'ein starres Gestäbe' as 'a rigid jungle gym' is one such.

Heidegger's interpretation is interspersed with passages from Schelling's book. When these passages amount to more than a sentence or so, Stambaugh quotes from James Gutman's translation of Schelling, rather than translating them herself. There is nothing wrong with that, especially since Gutmann's translation really is quite good. But an author is responsible for quotations too and when a quotation contains either nonsense or a discrepancy in the translation of important terms with their translation in the rest of the book, then an author must step in and amend the quotations. The lengthy quotation on p. 52 contains a translation by Gutmann of Schelling's translation of Sextus Empiricus. The journey of Sextus' Greek through German to English produces 'the literally minded and the uninformed' which is unacceptable. The Loeb edition of Sextus, Vol. IV, p. 175, contains a better version. And Schelling defines freedom as 'ein Vermögen des Guten und des Bösen.' Gutmann translates 'Vermögen' as 'possibility' in the passage quoted on p. 97. That's wrong. Stambaugh translates the term as 'capability' on the very same page. That's much better, but Gutmann should have been changed for the sake of consistency. And, speaking of consistency, why does Stambaugh abandon 'capability' and start using 'faculty' as a translation of 'Vermögen' after p. 148? Consistency in key terms is important.

There are also some translation difficulties which are more serious. For example on p. 9 we find a translation of 'Denn hier gilt die Freiheit nicht als Eigenschaft des Menschen, sondern umgekehrt: Der Mensch gilt allenfalls als Eigentum der Freiheit.' This Eigenschaft-Eigentum relation is repeated in the 'Merksatz' at the end of the paragraph. To translate both words as 'property' is a mistake. On p. 87 'ab-gehängt' should not have been translated as 'made dependent,' even with the German word supplied in parentheses; 'detached' is much better and very different. In the fourth concept of freedom on p. 88, 'the senses' is misleading as a translation of 'Sinnlichkeit.' On p. 152 'The dread for its [his] self, the "life-dread" present in the ground of Being drives it [him] to emerge from the centre, that is, to cling to separation and further it, and thus to pursue it [his] inclination' contains 'it' three times when 'he' is right, as indicated; the reference is to man, not to will.

There is a problem with the words 'beings' and 'Being.' Look at the following phrase: 'Eigentliches Wissen des Seienden in Ganzen.' It is translated

'True knowing of beings as a whole' (53). If you translate the English back into German you get: 'Wahres Wissen der Seienden als ein Ganzes.' There are three differences between that and the original. The words 'eigentlich' and 'uneigentlich' as Heideggerian words are generally familiar as 'authentic' and 'in-authentic.' They are translated by a number of English words, e.g. true, appropriate, real, etc., throughout the text. I wonder why using the familiar 'authentic' throughout was rejected. Second, the distinction between 'im Ganzen' and 'als ein Ganzes' can be made in English. But it is the difficulty with 'being' which troubles me the most. Heidegger uses three words: 'das Sein,' 'Being'; 'ein Seiendes,' 'a being' or 'an entity'; 'das Seiende,' 'that which is' or 'being.' To translate 'das Seiende' as 'beings' seems to me to be unfortunate, and it worried me in many places in the book. The phrase 'das Seiende im Ganzen' occurs often in Heidegger's book, and it is clear that he means by it not all the objects there are but that the notion is singular. For example, 'und daß dieses Seiende im Ganzen demzufolge ein Gegenstand sei' does not happily translate into 'and that these beings as a whole must consequently be objects' (45). To translate 'das Seiende' as 'beings' forces formulating Aristotle's notion of metaphysics to be the inquiry into 'what beings as beings are' while we're all much happier to leave it as the inquiry into 'being qua being.' It seems to me that to translate 'das Sein' as 'Being' (upper case B) and 'das Seiende' as 'being' (lower case b) would have been best.

Joan Stambaugh's translation of Heidegger's book is a welcome addition to the works of Heidegger in English. Some will read it to get a look at Schelling through the lens of an original mind of the present century. But most will read it to get another look at that original mind.

PETER PREUSS
The University of Lethbridge

ANTHONY KENNY. *The Ivory Tower: Essays in Philosophy and Public Policy*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1985. Pp. 137. Cdn\$37.50. ISBN 0-631-13985-0.

This book is a collection of papers by Kenny, most of which have been published previously, but a few of which are published here for the first time. They deal with issues which, the author claims in the Introduction, bring philosophical reflection out of the ivory tower, where it is often 'remote from the practi-

cal concerns of real life,' into the practical world of moral, legal and political thinking. The papers are concerned with two different areas of 'real life' problems. The first is within the philosophy of law, specifically the problem of the definition of murder in the criminal law, and the second within international politics, specifically the logic and ethics of nuclear warfare and the practice of nuclear deterrence.

What ties these two parts of the book together is that nearly all the papers in both sections are concerned with the issue of homicide and the conditions under which it is legally or morally justifiable or exculpable. In particular, the essays deal in one way or another with Kenny's area of philosophical expertise in philosophy of mind, focusing on issues of intent and purpose which are crucial to the *mens rea* of murder. The theme which emerges from the juxtaposition of the papers is that the same mental states relevant to the just determination of guilt for murder in the criminal law are also relevant to the moral distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable killing in warfare. The practice of threatening the nuclear annihilation of civilian populations for purposes of deterrence, Kenny argues in these papers, involves just those states of mind which we call murderous in domestic law and morality. They are no less murderous in the arena of international politics, and no more justifiable.

Two of the papers included in the collection do not really fit at all into this theme, however. One, 'The Expert in Court,' deals with the problem of conflicting expert testimony in court, which Kenny argues must be much more carefully controlled if it is not to undermine the traditional roles of juries and legislatures. The other, 'Enemies of Academic Freedom,' seems quite out of place in the collection. It is a lecture delivered at the University of Cape Town, in which Kenny defends the consistency of his lecturing in a South African University while at the same time boycotting South African goods and investments back home in Britain and opposing the right of South African politicians and other non-academics to lecture at British universities. The former he defends on grounds of academic freedom, which entails the right of academic faculties (though not individual academicians) to engage in open, critical dialogue with individual academicians, while the latter he opposes because it does not fall within the sphere of rights established by academic freedom.

In the first two philosophy of law papers Kenny defends a doctrine of intention in the law of murder he sees emerging in English law, which requires that murderous intent involve what Bentham called 'direct' intention (where the death of someone is sought as an end in itself or as a means to an end), and not merely 'oblique' intention (where the death is merely foreseen as a consequence of one's actions). He argues, against Hart and others, that the mere foresight that a death is likely to occur as a result of one's actions should not be taken as the 'malice aforethought' necessary to constitute the *mens rea* for murder. Rather, 'willingness to kill' should be defined in terms of *direct* intent to kill or 'to create a serious risk of death.'

Here, as in the papers on nuclear deterrence, Kenny is defending a version of the 'double effect' doctrine central to Catholic moral theology. In the nuclear deterrence case Kenny argues strongly from the perspective of the traditional

theory of the 'just war' within that same theology. Thus, he espouses the right of nations to defend themselves militarily against aggression or injustice, even using means which 'foresee,' but do not directly intend, the death of noncombatants. Nevertheless, Kenny argues that there is no way nuclear weapons can be used, threatened, or even deployed as instruments of national policy without involving the direct intent to kill innocent civilians or to create serious risk of their death on a massive scale. Hence, following his account of the *mens rea* of murder in the criminal law, Kenny argues that the practice of nuclear deterrence by a nation necessarily involves murderous, indeed *genocidal*, intent. He concludes that nuclear disarmament is a moral imperative, even if it must be done unilaterally. A common argument against such a radical policy by 'just war' theorists is that even though nuclear deterrence is morally regrettable, it is in some way provisionally acceptable in the present international climate because of *necessity*. Again Kenny has anticipated this argument by the inclusion in his philosophy of law section of the book a paper on 'Duress as a Defense to Crime,' in which he defends the Anglo-Saxon legal doctrine that necessity and duress are not legitimate defences against the crime of murder as they may be against other offences. Neither, Kenny implies, are they defences against the crime of nuclear genocide.

CONRAD G. BRUNK
Conrad Grebel College
Waterloo, Ontario

OLIVER LEAMAN. *An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xii + 208. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24707-1); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28911-4).

Leaman's book discusses the medieval Islamic philosophers Farabi, Avicenna, Ghazali, Averroes, and the Jewish Maimonides. He focusses on two broad themes: I) Ghazali's attack on the philosophers for their three beliefs that 1) the world is eternal; 2) the individual human soul is not immortal; 3) God cannot know singulars, together with Averroes' defense of these positions. II) The conflict between philosophy and revelation on moral matters, including 4) whether religious ethics is objective or subjective and 5) what human happiness is.

The format of the book follows this outline precisely. After an introductory chapter, including information on the Prophet Muhammad and biographical data on the individual authors, there are five chapters, one for each topic numbered in the preceding paragraph. The book concludes with a sixth chapter entitled 'How to read Islamic philosophy.'

The book reads well and anyone who is not an Islamic scholar will learn from it. Leaman brings out the robust intelligence and perceptiveness of Ghazali's objections. Many will be familiar with Ghazali's denial that there is any necessary causal connection, as the philosophers claim. Our belief in causality is based on experience, Ghazali argues, and observation proves only simultaneity, not necessary causal connections. Our belief in causality is nothing more than a habit established in us by the will of God (76-8). Less familiar is Ghazali's argument against objectivity in ethics. Ghazali's purpose is to deny that God is compelled by external ethical principles. He therefore defines the ethical notions of good and evil as purely egoistic notions: 'good' meaning an act promotes our ends, 'bad' meaning it does not, where these ends are entirely relative to the agent. Only acts with personal ends can be called evil. But God, being without any needs, is without any ends, and so we are mistaken when we try to apply the parochial human notions of ethics to God (131-4).

Leaman notes the subtle treatment of the notion of possibility in Avicenna. Avicenna holds that a being may be possible in itself although necessary through another. God is necessary through himself in the sense that assuming he does not exist leads to a contradiction. The concept of other entities does not include their existence, and so they are contingent in themselves, relying on something else to bring them into existence. But once caused, these contingent beings are, with respect to their cause, necessary (28-30). Leaman argues that the only way to understand Avicenna is to recognize that he is relying on the Aristotelian 'principle of plenitude,' the principle that whatever is possible has happened or will happen at some time (32). Leaman notes that the principle is also used in an argument the philosophers give for the eternity of the world, an argument which uses the premise that since the existence of the world has always been possible, it must always have been actual (50-1). He claims that the principle of plenitude is the key doctrine which the Islamic philosophers accepted from Aristotle and that this doctrine makes their views unacceptable to orthodox believers, for it seems to leave no place for any real influence of God on the world (119). Since whatever is truly possible apparently must exist according to the principle of plenitude, God cannot exercise providence over the possibilities of this world.

Leaman's final chapter on 'How to read Islamic philosophy' criticizes the esoteric interpretation of medieval Islamic philosophy which maintains that the Islamic philosophers, fearful of punishment by religious authorities, hid their true beliefs behind a screen of ambiguities and technical discussions which only the most learned would be able to pierce. Leaman allows that there were instances of this, the most famous being Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*. But Leaman objects that the *Guide* is a unique work, unsuitable as the model of interpretation for other works, and that even in reading the *Guide* interpreters

such as Leo Strauss have opted for an esoteric interpretation where a more straightforward philosophical analysis is available (199-200).

Leaman insists that his book concentrates on the philosophical nature of the arguments of the Islamic thinkers (200-1). He does not stress their intellectual predecessors, nor does he seek to relate them to either the Scholastic successors or contemporary issues (xi-xii). He does not even think that Islamic philosophy is notably creative, but he does think it deals with interesting and important arguments touching on crucial issues in Greek philosophy (20).

The discussions of necessity and possibility in chapters 1 and 3, or of ethical voluntarism in chapter 4 support his claim that the arguments are interesting; it is not clear, however, what audience is being addressed. The book is not meant for the complete novice, for it assumes antecedent familiarity with the authors and with the issues. The promisingly titled chapter, 'How to read Islamic philosophy' is not meant for the first time reader. Scholars, on the other hand, will not find leads as to where Ghazali likely got his arguments. There are allusions without references, such as to what Aristotle meant by the material intellect (104), or that Aristotle held that human intelligence is not capable of knowing the most intelligible beings (107). The latter claim is an inference from Aristotle's remark that humans, with regard to the most intelligible things, are like bats in the sun. Leaman does not give the reference to *Met.* II, 1, nor does he mention *De An.* III, 4 where Aristotle tells us that the soul is never hurt by confronting the most intelligible things. Finally, philosophers will be disappointed at how brief the treatment is of arguments which clearly call for more detailed analysis. For example, Leaman claims that Avicenna could, given his principles, argue that God has knowledge of all particulars even though He lacks senses or sense-knowledge. Leaman states (117-18): 'It is not necessary actually to have sense-experience for empirical knowledge to be possible. Much of our empirical knowledge is arrived at not through our own investigations, but through the evidence which others pass onto us. ... God possesses all the evidence because he has determined that it is to be evidence. ... He can know each and every empirical fact of his creation without the necessity to acquire that knowledge through the senses.' In another place (126-7) Leaman argues: 'A voluntarist could claim that what is meant by "wrong" ... is quite simply what God defines as wrong' and that to insist the word has a sense independent of God's command merely begs the question.

R.G. WENGERT
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign

EMMANUEL LEVINAS. *Ethics and Infinity*. Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh 1985. Pp. 125. US\$10.00. ISBN 0-8207-0178-5.

Ethics and Infinity is an edited version of radio interviews of Emmanuel Levinas by Philippe Nemo. As a retrospective, the discussion covers the Bible and philosophy, Husserl and Heidegger, and Levinas' fifty years in philosophy. It will be welcomed by those familiar with Levinas or those seeking a bird's eye view of his philosophical concerns. Only the section on Heidegger exceeds ten pages in length. For a more substantial treatment of Levinas, one should refer to *Le Temps et l'autre* and *Totality and Infinity*. *Ethics and Infinity* is like a plate of *borts d'œuvres*, and however tasty, tends to leave the reader a bit hungry. It, nevertheless, does offer some insights into Levinas' work.

The title underscores central concerns: the task of thinking itself as ethics and ethics as a metaphysical concern. 'The face signifies the infinite,' asserts Levinas, thereby pointing to both *Ethics and Infinity* and his earlier *Totality and Infinity*. Not only do we discover the Other in his/her face, but responsibility — which, for Levinas, is responsibility for the other — is met 'as face.'

Just as Heidegger anchored his thought in the ancient Greeks, Levinas sees philosophy, and certainly his own philosophical thought, linked to the Bible. For him the texts of 'the great philosophers' — his big five being Plato, Kant, Hegel, Bergson and Heidegger — 'are closer to the Bible than opposed to it' (23).

Durkheim and Bergson were pivotal influences on Levinas' early years, and in his view, key figures for understanding Husserl and Heidegger. Durkheim's theory of 'levels of being' ('The idea that the social is the very order of the spiritual') and Bergson's theory of duration ('The credit goes to Bergson for having liberated philosophy from the prestigious model of scientific time') are most thoroughly developed in the work of Heidegger. Although he speaks of Husserl and Heidegger together, Levinas clearly favours the latter. Yet, it is unfortunate that Husserlian phenomenology is not given more attention here, since Levinas' view of it seems to have broadened and softened since *Theorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (published in 1930). That Levinas' discussion of Husserl in *Ethics and Infinity* slides into reference to Heidegger does not seem very surprising. As Levinas remarks, 'God himself can know a material thing only by turning around it. Being commands the access to being. The access to being belongs to the description of being. I think that here also Heidegger is announced' (31).

Levinas considers *Sein und Zeit* to have had the most impact on his own work. 'Heidegger's philosophy,' he claims, '... is a great event in our century. Philosophizing without having known Heidegger would involve a share of "naïvete" in the Husserlian sense of the term' (42). For Levinas, '*Sein und Zeit* has remained the very model of ontology' (41).

An aspect of 'the great philosopher' that troubles Levinas is Heidegger's 'political engagements.' 'I have never forgotten those engagements and Heidegger has never been exculpated in my eyes from his participation in National Socialism' (41). Too bad the issue is then dropped. Is it wise to overlook social

or personal moral decay and gaze solely upon the written text? Although many of us might not care to read a Hitlerian *Critique of Practical Reason* or a Somozan *On Civil Government*, we are yet cognizant of our own moral flabbiness and tend to shrink away from the whole matter.

Levinas' discussion of 'the masculine and the feminine' seems the weakest, most problematic section of the text, wherein the view of women evokes images found in Gothic novels. Women are characterized as the 'of itself other.' 'What matters to me in this notion of the feminine,' says Levinas, 'is not merely the unknowable, but a mode of being which consists in slipping away from the light ... it is a flight before the light. The way of existing of the feminine is hiding, or modesty' (67).

Hiding? Modesty? Flight before light? What is all this about? Women don't scurry into corners when lights go on, nor is it clear that they are innately more modest than men. Levinas speaks of these qualities as 'givens,' but it is hard to take it literally. Or seriously. With the only other, by his own admission, 'significant relation' that of fathers and sons, this seems somewhat like those antiquated texts addressed to men with references, if any, to women as 'them,' the 'of itself others' who more resemble elusive, delicate prey than earthy, sometimes formidable, human beings.

If we are to move beyond the Husserlian model and get into the meatiness of being in the world, we must recognize that the world consists of more than cogitating males. Levinas is right to emphasize our relations with others and to see how great is our responsibility to those others. It is, therefore, imperative that we recognize who those others are and how complex are those relationships. Neither paternity nor eroticism encompasses the range of models of being in the world, and neither sexist language nor over-zealous narrowing of significant relationships will provide us with a model both inclusive and diverse enough to address the numerous possibilities of being. As Levinas himself notes in seeing infinity in the face, we humans are deep and complex creatures. And just as Heidegger had to go beyond Husserl and Levinas sought to extend Heidegger, so too can we learn from Levinas and go forward.

WANDA TEAYS

Institute for Critical and

Creative Thinking

University of Massachusetts, Boston

HUGO A. MEYNELL. *The Nature of Aesthetic Value*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. vi + 158. US\$24.50. ISBN 0-88706-118-4.

In the first two chapters, the author formulates his theory of the grounds of aesthetic value and his concept of aesthetic satisfaction. In the book's remaining three chapters, on 'goodness' in literature, in visual art, and in music, he puts on exhibit the assessments that many professional art critics have made of works in these three areas. He takes this to be a better way of vindicating his theory of the earmarks of aesthetic value than himself indulging in 'first-order critical comment' (48).

According to the theory, such critical comments — aesthetic judgments — are like ordinary factual judgments inasmuch as they entail statements which if negated upset the judgment. But, in the aesthetic case, the entailment is 'loose' (4), meaning it takes 'more than a small proportion' of the entailed statements to be negated to upset the judgment. The criterion for being a reliable art critic involves a similar logic: the statement that A is a good judge of art is falsified only if A fails to appreciate more than a small proportion of the recognized classics (37). But this logic does not make aesthetic judgments subjective. Rather it shows that the aesthetician's concern is not just with the nature of things in themselves, but with their relation to intelligent, sensitive beings (10). One may be objective about this, though the concern embraces human subjects and the objectivity is friendlier ('looser') than the stern ('strict') thing it is in exact science.

Proceeding thus, it becomes clear that the first big consideration must be of human nature, as grounding pronouncements about the nature of aesthetic value and aesthetic satisfaction. Fundamentally, this is a question 'for the evolutionary biologist' (47), the presumption being that an enlarged and clarified consciousness, promoted by art, has 'survival value' (47) by contributing 'to the happiness and satisfaction to be got out of human life' (7). This biological fact concerning 'the manner in which man as a species has evolved' underlies the relativisms of convention (65), making objective judgment feasible.

Basically, human consciousness operates at four levels: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision (26), attended by the appropriate satisfaction (if successful). Aesthetic satisfaction is fairly global, but in relation to works of art, it can be ('loosely') defined. Collingwood's intuition-expression theory is criticized as too restrictive though saved by a larger right-mindedness. Dickey's institutional theory is praised for not coming into conflict with the author's theory (21). Kant is not even mentioned, presumably because the author considers a person 'bossy' (23) who thinks that his first-order aesthetic judgments of taste command assent of everybody. The pleasure theorists are warned that 'satisfaction' or 'appreciation' is a less misleading term than 'pleasure,' which favors hedonism. Some satisfactions, especially *vis-à-vis* great art works, are too staggering to be called pleasant (25) — a point that deserves emphasis.

Accordingly, the correct view of aesthetic value, and how it is assessed in art works, distinguishes between its 'constitutive' properties and those that are

'merely conducive' to it (12). What 'constitutes' the value of a work of art, its 'very essence' (19), is its capacity or disposition to activate, nurture, and thus to enhance 'consciousness' or 'human life.' The experience or feeling of this happening is thus the essential mark of aesthetic value, its constitutive property. The properties merely conducive to aesthetic value are more the result of the artist's technical competence brought to bear on the medium of the art genre in question, the overall requirement for any good work of art here being that it exhibit 'unity in variety.' Any art work that has this property will 'exercise the basic human mental capacities' (133), thus being conducive to the satisfaction which is the constitutive property (essence) of aesthetic value. An artifact possessing these 'merely conducive' properties 'causes' the aesthetic satisfaction that is essential to aesthetic value (46). Of course, for this to occur, both the subject of the experience and the art object must have met certain conditions.

What these conditions are like is brought out in the discussion of art as oriented towards entertainment, ideology, etc., and of what it is for art to be appreciated in literature, in the visual arts, and in music. The person who turns mainly to entertainment art for satisfaction is protecting predispositions that that serious art would disturb. Not that good art cannot also be entertaining (Shakespeare), or that entertainment in itself serves no good purposes at all, but that 'to appreciate a good serious work of art one must exercise powers of concentration and imagination somewhat like those involved in the creation of it' (39). Most people don't want the 'expanded and clarified consciousness' that this results in. The vegetable condition is more comfortable, with belly-laughs that express it.

There are other ways of treating art as instrumental to non-aesthetic purposes. The author takes a conciliatory position on these issues. If an ideological, or religious, or moral agent can adequately show that a class of art works, howsoever good on purely aesthetic counts, jeopardizes a cause for, say, much needed social improvement, then censoring is in order. But, of course, such conflicts tend in fact not to occur, where the art in question is good by the principles of the aesthetic theory propounded in this book. *Any* occasion for the exercise of basic human faculties is *pro tanto* good, even where the value is not primarily aesthetic. And even the value of a work of art requires the work to be *conducive* to a bettered life. So whether art is to be thought of as 'practical' or not is a delicate issue. On the interpretation given it in this book that art should be practical is compatible with, e.g., the Marxist view, but with reservations.

However, there is still the question of the condition one is in where he is a professional scientist, relative to the aesthetic value of art. Can he fully appreciate it? Science is truth-oriented, meaning that its business is 'achieving a theoretical understanding of the real world' (44). What then should we say about 'the relation of appreciation of good art to knowledge of the truth' (44)? At first blush, in view of this, one supposes that the relation is unfriendly, as Plato thought, as if the good artist, looking at the 'real' world, justifiably judges that one of the damn things is enough and, in his composition, depicts a beau-

tiful unreal one. But the author's intention is against this judgment, presumably because of his not very clear notion that 'understanding of the real world' is not just an affair of entertaining literally formulated true propositions *de rerum natura*. His notion of 'loose' entailment of aesthetic judgments, noted above, does not sufficiently clarify the more genial concept of truth and reality, though a charitable interpretation of his overall principle of 'unity in variety' seems to do the trick.

The last three chapters — the bulk of the book — in which art critics at work are portrayed are very worth pondering, not only as ('loose') confirmation of the author's aesthetic theory, but as an education in the field of art.

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH
University of Utah

H.A. MEYNELL, ed. *Religion and Irreligion*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1985. Pp. viii + 178. Cdn\$11.00. ISBN 0-919813-23-2.

This volume contains the papers presented at a conference held at the University of Calgary in October of 1983. The contributors are N.E. Wagner (Preface), Hugo Meynell, Terence Penelhum, Ronald Neufeldt, Jack MacIntosh, Donald Evans and Kai Nielsen. Meynell contributed the Introduction, a paper, and a reply to MacIntosh's critique of his views.

I did not attend the conference in question, but am sure that the participants found it productive. Whether the papers and commentaries read merited presentation to a larger audience, though, is problematic. Perhaps the best piece is MacIntosh's critique of Meynell. I think MacIntosh right in his summation of Meynell's argument and his identification of the pivotal point in Meynell's paper as the idea that the universe is intelligible as a whole and that that needs explanation. MacIntosh offers a detailed assessment of Meynell's argument — and of Meynell's use of problematic notions such as primary and secondary qualities, his dualism and his failure to give us a clear sense of 'explanation.' But MacIntosh's most telling point is simply that the theist will find intelligibility and a need for explanation where the atheist finds neither. Meynell begins his reply with what is in effect a concession of this point, contending that it is 'plain as a pikestaff' that the universe is intelligible (91). To my mind nothing in Meynell's reply meets the point. I think the failure to connect here is representative of the general character of the collection. There is a parallel in the

Evans/Nielsen exchange. Nielsen responds to Evans' discussion of Nielsen's views on the relation between religion and morality. Evans attempts to relate — really to base — morality on his own, let me say, 'flexible' conception of religion. Nielsen begins with a well-taken point, challenging the 'Irreligion' part of the title of the collection. He rightly takes exception to being categorized as 'irreligious' because he is atheistic. Nielsen continues with a detailed assessment of Evans' exposition of Nielsen's views, and concludes with some remarks with which I thoroughly agree about 'deep incoherencies' in Evans' views. (163) Nielsen complains that Evans' claim that 'God is not a content' but rather is 'creative pure consciousness' or 'the pregnant void' simply leaves us baffled as to what is meant. Here again, as in the Meynell/MacIntosh exchange, the theist finds intelligibility or meaningfulness where the atheist or nontheist does not.

Unfortunately nothing in the other papers goes any way toward resolving the head-on clash of Rortyan 'conversations.' Penelhum, in fact, concludes that there is as much of a 'stand-off' among religions as between the religious and the nonreligious and speaks of the stand-offs as 'ultimate' (20-1). The collection, then, seems to this reviewer to contribute very little to the debate it addresses. I thought it ironic that the cover of the book, diagonally divided into black and white segments, shows a grey strip between those segments, optimistically suggesting a meeting of minds.

C.G. PRADO
Queen's University

HOLMES ROLSTON, III. *Religious Inquiry — Participation and Detachment*. New York: Philosophical Library 1985. Pp. xiv + 309. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-8022-2450-4.

Holmes Rolston has written a unique and fascinating book about the nature of religious knowledge. With Wittgenstein he asks the question, 'Can one learn this knowledge?' Like Wittgenstein, Rolston's response is 'yes,' but through *experience* rather than by taking a course (271). Then why a book? Because a book, like a good teacher, can evoke experience. Thus the book is written as a spiritual journey, or more correctly as a critical reflection on the spiritual journey of four master pilgrims: Augustine, a Christian; Ghazali, a Muslim; Sankara, a Hindu; and Nagarjuna, a Buddhist. Rolston's tactic is to have the reader catch a glimpse of religious experience by standing on the shoulders

of these four spiritual giants — to enable us to see further (x). These four are selected because they are foundational figures in their traditions and because each 'has left a journal, a commentary, as a path to the performative nature of religious truth' (viii). The book strives for a mix of biographical detail, reflective piety and competing plurality. Rolston's thesis is that for religious inquiry both detachment and participation are needed. He presents his case effectively.

Chapter one introduces the four saints and argues that 'religious truth requires becoming righteous in order to become cognitively right ... it demands participation' (x). In Chapter Two the nature of this participation is analyzed under the headings of love, faith, purity and humility. These virtues, argues Rolston, direct the mind to truth by leading to a kind of *detachment* — the second and opposite idea indicated in the title of the book.

The limits of religious language are explored in chapter three. In different ways the four saints evidence a need to go beyond the conceptual experience of words to the perceptual experience that, at their best, they evoke. Grasping religious truth, says Rolston, requires the allowing of oneself to be carried beyond the words to an active participation. This is his major assumption which reappears throughout the book. The role of the teacher is to guide the student through *conceptions* into *perceptions* (74). What Rolston does not make clear, however, is that the term *perception* here has a special meaning, namely, mystical intuition or knowing by becoming-one-with God or reality — participatory as opposed to the detached subject-object perception of most contemporary academic study. Rolston is sensitive to the way in which words are seen by Nagarjuna as simply conceptual obstructions to be removed so that the ever-present perception of reality (*prajna*) can be experienced (83). But he misses the point that Sankara, by contrast, sees Vedic words as the necessary means through which the real is evoked, even though in the end even the sacred words themselves are transcended (74-7). Rolston does not fully appreciate that for the Vedic word to evoke the real it must be *orally transmitted* from teacher (*guru*) to student at exactly the right moment. The written depersonalized word, says the Hindu, simply does not have the power to move one from detachment to participation in the real. Modern book-learning falls short of the participatory perception required for religious truth.

Chapter four examines the difficult issue of how religious experience embraces subjectivity and objectivity and carries one beyond both to 'a kind of communicant or unitative tasting which intimately links the knower with, and even consumes the knower in, the known' (xi). Participation leads to a final sense of detachment as the self is given up in order to know the real. Up to this point in his study Rolston finds the four saints to be in essential agreement.

Chapters five and six shift the ground of the inquiry to the question as to how and how much a believer in one tradition can understand and judge the experiences of believers of other traditions. While we can know about other traditions, in a descriptive sense, it is only our own tradition to which we are ultimately committed that can be known intimately rather than just descriptively and so understood. Knowing in religion is like knowing one's lover. Others can give the same descriptive knowledge of my wife as I can — birth date, na-

tionality, family history, hair and eye colour, etc. — but only through the commitment of a devoted love do I understand and know her at a deeper level than external description can achieve. Thus in examining the experiences of each saint, Rolston finds areas which are not open to the other saints or to us. 'Unless we are Muslims, Mecca is forbidden to us' (161). This distinction between levels of knowing is probed under the headings such as 'Circumstantial and circumferential meaning,' 'Comparative and consanguine meaning,' 'Compassionate and covivial meaning,' and 'Understanding versus undergoing.' The Buddhist experience represents one extreme in this regard. It is only by compassion that the *bodhisattva* understands reality — words alone are empty. 'Hence only a Buddha understands another Buddha in their shared common life' (176). This distinction is highlighted in chapter six by studying the way in which each saint develops a doctrine of error inclusive of all other beliefs in establishing his own. Thus ultimately religious experience leads to difference rather than to unity. This is especially evident when Augustine and Ghazali are compared with the Eastern saints Sankara and Nagarjuna. Even between the latter pair the gulf seems unbridgeable, with Sankara experiencing reality as pure Being whereas for Nagarjuna it is pure Becoming.

The final chapter, 'Learning (about) Religion' is the best. It brings the results of the enquiry to bear on the question of how religion is to be taught in the modern educational context. The major headings employed for this discussion are: 'The Empirical — Studying Extrareligiously,' including both the behavioural and phenomenological methods; 'the Ecumenical — Studying Interreligiously' where the 'about' in learning (about) religion fades into translucency; and finally 'The Catechetical — Studying Intrareligiously' where we leave the forum to seek the sanctuary and the student becomes a disciple. The debate over the methodology of teaching in the field of Religious Studies is very current — see articles in the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* by Segal (1983), Reat (1983), Wiebe (1984), and Comstock (1984). Rolston makes a refreshing contribution by reviewing the main issues of the debate in the context of the wisdom provided by Augustine, Ghazali, Sankara and Nagarjuna. The wisdom of these saints of four very different religions effectively enlarges and deepens the discussion. Sensitivities are sharpened which are often lacking in the contemporary debate. A good example is Augustine's comment on what it is that a teacher can do:

The maximum import I can attribute to words is this. They suggest we look for things, but they do not so exhibit these to us that we may know them. He alone teaches me anything who sets before my eyes, or one of my other bodily senses, or my mind, the things which I desire to know. From words we can only learn words ... With the knowledge of things there is completed the knowledge of words, but when mere words are learned, not even those are learned ... In all things which we understand, we consult not the speaker who says words, but the truth within presiding over the mind itself, though we may have been prompted by words to do so.

At this point the medieval Augustine and the contemporary Wittgenstein come together. In the area of religion at least, the teacher cannot directly teach the

noumenal knowledge of religion, but the true teacher, in teaching about religion, can prompt, provoke and guide the student into an evocation of some sacred experience (270-1).

This book is well written and carefully researched — a major achievement considering the four quite different traditions included. It brings fresh though ancient wisdom to the contemporary debate over how to study and teach religion. One criticism is this: could not some Jewish saint have been included — then all the major world religions would have been represented. To exclude a representative saint from early Judaism seems unjustified in method as well as in the loss of the unique wisdom that tradition has to offer.

HAROLD COWARD
Religious Studies
University of Calgary

JOHN SEARLE and DANIEL VANDERVEKEN. *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. ix + 227. US\$34.50.
ISBN 0-521-26324-7.

In their new book *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*, Searle and Vanderveken attempt to provide 'a formalized logic of a general theory of speech acts' (ix). The book has two principal goals: to define recursively the class of all illocutionary forces; and to construct an axiomatic theory of the relations of 'illocutionary commitment,' 'illocutionary consistency' and several related notions.

The authors identify seven components of illocutionary force. These are more or less familiar from Searle's earlier book *Speech Acts* and his paper 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts'; they include illocutionary point, the mode of achievement of the illocutionary point, preparatory conditions, and so on. Each of the components is represented by a relation or a function — for example, an illocutionary point becomes a relation on $(I \times Prop)$, the product of the set of contexts and the set of propositions. An illocutionary force is then identified with the septuple of its components.

According to the authors, there are only five illocutionary points: the assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and expressive points. There are also five 'primitive' illocutionary forces, one corresponding to each of the five points. Six operations are defined on illocutionary force, one of which changes each of the components of force other than the point. For example, there is one

operation that restricts the mode of achievement, another that adds preparatory conditions, and so on. The authors claim that all possible illocutionary forces can be derived from the five primitive ones by repeated applications of these six operations. (They call this claim 'the hypothesis of constructibility'.)

An illocutionary act has the form $F(P)$, where F is a force and P is a proposition. The authors define two relations on illocutionary acts, the relations of *strong* and *weak illocutionary commitment*. An illocutionary act $F(P)$ strongly commits the speaker to $F'(P')$ iff it is impossible to perform $F(P)$ without performing $F'(P')$. For example, a prediction that the sun will rise strongly commits one to an assertion that the sun will rise, since predictions are a species of assertion. The definition of weak commitment is more complicated; one can be weakly committed to an illocutionary act without performing it and without being committed to its performance (24). For example, someone who asserts both that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man is weakly committed to the assertion that Socrates is mortal (24) (but *not* to the assertion that Socrates is either mortal or Greek [168]). The concepts of strong and weak illocutionary commitment are symbolized and axiomatized, and a number of theorems are derived. These concepts are also used to define the notions of illocutionary consistency, illocutionary entailment, and a self-defeating speech act.

On the whole, I found the book disappointing. In spite of the considerable effort directed towards giving a formal definition of illocutionary force, there is nothing in the book to help those of us who are unclear about exactly what an illocutionary force is. Consider, for example, the definition (mentioned above) of illocutionary point as a relation between contexts and propositions. There are an infinite number of such relations, but we are told that only five of these represent illocutionary points. What makes these five relations special? Nothing in the formalization tells us. Thus the formalization does not help us to understand what an illocutionary point is. This pattern occurs repeatedly; the authors formally define the various components of an illocutionary force (for example, the mode of achievement) as functions or relations of some kind K . But only some of the objects of these kinds represent possible components of force, since only some of the members of K are 'linguistically significant' (111). And nothing in the formalization tells us what it is to be linguistically significant. So the definitions serve, at best, a purely formal purpose; they do nothing to help us understand the nature of the components that make up illocutionary force.

Perhaps the authors take the concept of illocutionary force to be familiar and do not really expect the definition to clarify it. But other, less familiar, concepts are never explained in a satisfactory way. For example, the crucial notion of a weak illocutionary commitment is defined in terms of (i) the speaker being committed to an illocutionary point, (ii) his being committed to certain presuppositions, and (iii) his being committed to certain propositional attitudes (24). The first of these notions is defined (but not until p. 90) in terms of the third; the second, we are told, is a 'primitive' relation (108). Then, in a baffling paragraph on p. 109, (iii) is defined in terms of (iv), the notion of one

set of propositional attitudes committing a person to another set, and — in the same paragraph — (iv) is defined in terms of (iii). I was not able to find a way out of the circle. Had it not been for the examples the authors provide, the notion of a weak illocutionary commitment would have remained completely opaque.

These problems with the definitions of illocutionary force and of weak illocutionary commitment indicate the book's major weakness: the concepts being formalized are not sufficiently clarified either in an informal way or by the formalization itself. As a result, many readers may be left without the motivation to work through the details of the theory.

The book is not well organized. As the example of the definition of illocutionary commitment illustrates, terms are sometimes introduced before being defined, and sometimes there is no clear indication as to whether or not these are technical terms. On one occasion, a theorem is proved by referring to a law — the 'law of introduction of &' — which is not stated until several pages after the proof (161, 166). This sort of thing makes the book very difficult to read. An index would help a great deal, but there is none.

In spite of my complaints, the book does contain some interesting material. I particularly enjoyed the detailed description of the components of the five primitive forces and (in the final chapter) the analysis of a large number of derived forces. These analyses are not always persuasive, however. In particular, the authors claim that the illocutionary point of a directive, such as a command or an order, is 'to try to get people to do things.' It follows that 'a successful performance of an act of that type necessarily achieves that purpose' (14). I think this is a mistake; might an officer not order a subordinate to do something without trying to get him to do it? (Imagine the officer saying, 'I'm afraid that I have to order you to shoot the prisoner. To be frank, I'd be just as happy if you refused, but you have to understand that it's your own neck.') Perhaps such an order would be deviant in some sense, but it would still be an order.

There are a number of less important mistakes as well. For example, the authors claim that 'to approve something is to declare that it is valid or good' (207). Since they also say that the point of a declaration is to bring about the state of affairs represented (39), it follows that a person who approves something brings it about that the thing is good. But this is obviously not true; one can foolishly approve something that is (and remains) bad. Another example: the authors give an analysis of the verb 'pray' from which it follows that no one has ever prayed unless God, or 'some other sacred person or entity,' exists (205). (This suggests a novel proof of the existence of a sacred being.) These mistakes are not very serious, but they suggest that at least some parts of the book were written without a great deal of care.

WILLIAM K. BLACKBURN
University of Alberta

SYDNEY SHOEMAKER and RICHARD SWINBURNE. *Personal Identity*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1984. Pp. 158. Cdn\$15.75 (paper: ISBN 0-631-13432-8).

The basic theme of this work is an argument by Swinburne in favour of a theory of personal identity in terms of 'immaterial stuff' (27), followed by an argument by Shoemaker in favour of a theory of personal identity in terms of '*non-branching* psychological continuity' (115-16). Superficially, one could characterize Swinburne as a dualist and Shoemaker as a materialist; but in fact, Shoemaker is as little inclined as Swinburne to consider the physical brain as a sufficient basis for explaining personal identity, and he furthermore regards his own brand of materialism as 'compatible with dualism' (139). What appears to differentiate their positions is their respective conceptions of 'mind' within the framework of the body/mind distinction which they both take to be ultimate. This latter point is evident with Swinburne, and Shoemaker makes it quite explicit by asserting that the problem of personal identity is 'an aspect of the mind-body problem' (69).

For Swinburne, brain continuity as well as memory continuity are simply 'evidence of personal identity,' whereas personal identity itself is 'something distinct from them' (19-20). In other words, Swinburne spontaneously reifies the essential nature of mind as personal identity, and expresses this by asserting that there is nothing incoherent about the idea of a person becoming 'disembodied' (23-4). This leads him to the assertion of a 'stuff of another kind' which provides that continuity of stuff which is necessary for the identity of the person over time' (27). In order to approximate this concept of 'immaterial stuff' to that of 'personal identity,' Swinburne adds that 'There is nothing odd about supposing that soul-stuff comes in essentially indivisible units' (28), though he also adds that the overtones of a quasi-physical substance are not to be taken literally (31).

The arguments used cannot here be elaborated, and it will suffice to refer to some of them. For instance, the fact that in 'intentional actions' my body simply carries out my decisions, thereby implies that the 'I' could do the same if provided with an alternative body. Again, the use of a 'wider Aristotelian account' of 'substance,' is the basis for his assertion of an 'immaterial stuff.' And again, he uses the empirical fact of my experiencing, at least for short periods, my continuity over time or the fact that I can be the subject of different experiences at the same time, not to mention 'thought-experiments' involving 'brain-transplants,' 'quasi-memories' and the like. In a word, in order to explain that I am 'one person ... having ... experiences' (47), Swinburne sees no alternative to the assertion of an 'I' or personal identity which must be conceived as a separate entity or process, existing in its own right, and independent of the body.

As against this essentially Cartesian position, Shoemaker holds that any account of personal identity 'ought to be compatible with a naturalistic, or materi-

alistic, account of mind' (71). Whilst agreeing with Swinburne that the very idea of change 'logically requires that the successive states be states of numerically the same thing' (73), Shoemaker rejects the inference that this requires a reified mind-substance to be called 'personal identity.' Since it is evident that both body and mind are in constant process, it is not convincing to interpret what both conceive of as 'numerically the same thing' in terms of Swinburne's separate 'indivisible units.' It is within the process itself that identity or unity must be found. And this leads Shoemaker to interpret the situation in terms of the 'unity-relation' of a 'continuant' (75ff.). Whereas for Swinburne, 'memory-continuity' requires a separate or 'distinct' personal identity, for Shoemaker 'memory-continuity' is the basis for the possibility of later 'person-stages' having 'memory-connections' with earlier 'person-stages' (77-88). Invoking the aid of a number of 'imaginative' ways to avoid 'involving the notion of personal identity' (83), Shoemaker concludes that 'The definition of personal identity will then be in terms of quasi-remembering ...' (86).

The strategy seems clear. In order to avoid Swinburne's reifying move positioning a self-contained personal identity observing 'memory-continuity,' Shoemaker inverts the situation, and subordinates personal identity to memory-continuity. This makes of identity essentially a problem of 'person-stages.' In other words, 'psychological continuity' becomes the more general framework for personal identity: 'Memory continuity is now seen as just a special case of psychological continuity and it is in psychological continuity that personal identity is now held to consist' (90). This, then, is the alternative to Swinburne's self-contained, separate, reified, 'distinct' or 'indivisible' 'soul-stuff.'

Again, the detail of the argument is necessarily omitted here, and I will limit myself to those points which appear to be of particular significance. The first of these is the difficulty of accounting for the ability of a 'continuant' to know itself *as* a 'continuant' — a difficulty which Swinburne avoids, of course, by reifying personal identity. Shoemaker must find an explanation within the very process of the continuant itself. He recognizes the *fact* of this 'self-consciousness' or knowledge of oneself as a unified continuant, and refers to it as 'synchronic psychological unity' or 'copersonality': 'synchronic psychological unity will always be copersonal' (100). At the same time, identity within succession is also recognized: '... diachronic psychological unity will be copersonality as long as no "branching" (e.g. fission) has occurred in the development of the succession of states' (101). But how are these facts of experience to be *explained*?

Not in terms of a theory of the person as either a 'logical construct' or as simply a 'sum of person-stages' (101). But then in terms of what? Shoemaker's answer appears to be in terms of simply limiting oneself to the facts of empirical experience: '... my point is that the nature of personal identity is, in effect, determined by the nature of the various sorts of mental states persons have. Once we have said what the mental states are, and specified their functional natures, there is no room for conventional decisions about what the identity conditions of their subjects are — those identity conditions are built in to the

nature of the states' (101). A pain is not simply a pain in general: it is *my* pain or *your* pain.

But since this 'I' or 'you' can at least be distinguished as a locus of 'mental states,' to what do these words really refer? Shoemaker's answer can perhaps be summarized by saying that it refers to a particular experiencing-body. This certainly seems to follow from his rejection of Swinburne's reified personal identity, together with formulations like the following: 'the facts about self-knowledge are entirely compatible with the functionalist psychological continuity view ...' (104), and this latter 'is entirely compatible with a materialist view ...' (*ibid.*). Shoemaker illustrates the position by reference to the 'thought-experiment' which he calls the 'brain-state transfer device' (108-11). There is no need to go into the details of this more sophisticated version of the habitual 'brain transfer' 'thought experiment.' The purpose is clear enough. It is to assert the theoretical possibility of a 'transfer' of a state of mind as distinct from the physical brain: a transfer of 'information' or 'software' from one (used) brain to another (unused) brain.

Such a general conception implies a 'person-preserving' possibility without having to either reify personal identity or reduce it to 'the identity of a body' (110). But conversely, the position implies that 'mental states are realized in, or at least supervenient on, states of the brain' (110). And this means that though the position is compatible with dualism, and even (in the 'information' sense) with 'disembodied' existence' (139), it is not the 'simple view' which argues 'from the imaginability of disembodiment to dualism' (144). The 'complex' view of personal identity, Shoemaker's own view, allows for both dualism and the recognition that 'nothing non-physical is involved' (111).

So on the one hand, we have a personal identity conceived as a quasi-thing, quite 'distinct' from all bodily processes. And on the other, we have a personal identity which refers to 'the functional role of psychological unity and copersonality' (128), a concept which implies a rejection of the idea that 'there is a real essence' of personal identity. Apart from personal preferences, is it possible to choose between these two views? The difficulty with any ontologically dualist position is to explain just how the 'mind' or 'personal identity' side of the body mind framework *can* interact with the body. Swinburne just assumes that it does — as did Descartes before him. But such an assumption does not constitute an explanation.

Conversely, the difficulty with Shoemaker's position is to understand just how 'psychological unity' and 'copersonality' are possible. To put it in terms of his 'brain-state transfer' device, the difficulty is to give content to the idea of a 'state of mind' as the supposed 'information' of a physical brain-state, an 'information which is, in principle, 'transferable.' In point of fact, it seems to me that what Shoemaker is really doing is simply extending the word 'materialism' to cover both brain-states in the strict, physico-chemical, sense of the term, and states of mind as resulting from these brain-states. But as with Freud's 'unconscious,' that is to state the *problem*, not the solution. What is needed is some kind of elucidation of the conditions for the possibility of such a situation. To use the concepts of 'psychological unity', 'copersonality' and 'infor-

mation' does not seem to be enough to do the job. This 'great debate' simply confirms me in my conviction that what is really in question here is the body/mind framework considered as the presupposed real basis of the debate itself.

ALBERT SHALOM
McMaster University

ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI. *Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985. Pp. ix + 224. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-253-33871-9.

Robert Sokoloski's project in *Moral Action* is to give a phenomenological grammar of moral life. In order to do this, he utilizes basic Husserlian logical distinctions between parts and wholes, perceptual and categorial articulation, identification and distinction, and empty and filled intentions. These distinctions are interwoven with Aristotelian themes such as virtue, *phronesis*, choice, deliberation, and character. This unlikely blend of Husserl and Aristotle has the effect of putting the phenomenological treatment of moral experience on a wholly new footing.

Sokolowski's philosophical style is unique. It consists in the precise articulation of distinctions, carefully layered on top of one another, each distinction highlighting or shading a different profile of the total phenomenon. The opening two chapters concentrate on the distinction between the 'voluntary' and the 'chosen.' Voluntary action is immediately accepted, unforced action by a person: the direct engagement in a performance for the sake of the good enjoyed in the course of the performance. The chosen, by contrast, involves the articulation of the undifferentiated voluntary into an ultimate purpose or end, seen over against some variety of possible pathways to or from that end. Each of the possible pathways is the contour of some possible action as 'chosen in view' of the end or purpose; each pathway thereby 'participates' in that end. The emergence of the chosen from the voluntary signals the arrival of 'categoriality' in human action. Categoriality is the structure present in judgment of all types, whereby a thing (or things) is (or are) taken *as* or *in view of* something else which characterizes (or relates) the thing (or things).

Owing to its categoriality, choice is a central and characteristically human phenomenon, and all moral action depends upon it and its difference from

the simple or undifferentiated voluntary. Whereas the simple voluntary involves an immediate acceptance of an end, choice involves either 'deliberation' or 'preference' (17-18). Preference has less categoriality than deliberation in that it consists merely in a kind of shopping among possible voluntary ends, while deliberation involves the weighing of possible alternative pathways to or from the end. In addition, deliberation involves thinking about the concatenation of sub-performances along each pathway. Thus we can see that every full-blown choice involves a 'hermeneutic triangulation' (25) of three factors: end, pathway chosen, and concatenation of sub-performances within that pathway. This hermeneutic, categorial activity of choice always takes place in a public, discursive space of talk about the ends and pathways, and thereby cannot be reducible to a private, inner process.

The central part of the book (chapter 3) deals with the central topic: moral action. Moral action depends upon the structures of the voluntary and the chosen, but is not reducible to them. The analysis here turns on another distinction, that between the 'moral act' proper, and the 'material performance' (48). The material performance is the public, bodily behavior of the agent. The moral act proper is a move in the game of human relationships: it consists (1) in the 'appraisal' (56) which takes someone else's good or bad as one's own good or bad, and (2) in performing materially in accordance with this appraisal. The appraisal is logically but not necessarily temporally prior to the performance itself; quite frequently the appraisal becomes explicit only in the midst of the performance. Every moral act is a 'moral transaction' (74) between the moral agent and a moral patient who is the 'target' of the appraisal and performance.

The moral act and material performance are logically and ontologically complementary. Every moral act entails a possible material performance, and every material performance entails a possible moral act. Moreover, the actual act dwells or inhabits the actual performance in just the way that mindedness dwells or inhabits the human body. Insofar as the moral act dwells in the material performance, neither deontology nor consequentialism in ethics can be correct (52-4). For deontology's theory of action supposes that the moral act (i.e., willing or intentions) can be isolated logically and ontologically prior to and independently of material performances; while consequentialism's theory of action supposes that morally good or bad states of affairs (i.e., consequences) can be isolated posterior to and independently of material performances. Therefore deontology and consequentialism fail simply in virtue of their vitiating presuppositions about the structure of moral action.

The analysis of moral transactions brings Sokolowski's argument to a certain closure, insofar as all moral significance must ultimately be traced back to individual or collective moral transactions. The rest of the book, then, is a series of supplements to, or commentaries upon, the central thesis. The first supplement (chapter 4) starts from the observation that moral transactions can be understood only within a spoken context. Many moral actions are themselves 'speech-acts' in Austin's sense, and every moral transaction sits in the

midst of the common moral conversation of mankind. Sokolowski's account here amounts to an interesting and important convergence of Austinian speech-act theory and Husserlian phenomenology of language.

The second supplement (chapter 5) returns now at a higher level to the basic distinction between the chosen and the voluntary, and explores how it is that simple voluntaries may distort choices. For instance, the pathway chosen may blot out the end in virtue of which it was chosen, and lapse into a simple voluntary (99). Or the end may simply be used as an occasion or means to the enjoyment of the pathway. When this latter occurs, the moral quality of the end or purposed action is spoiled. In general, a moral action can be moral only if it is accepted immediately either as a simple voluntary or as that in view of which choices are made. In a word, actions are moral only if done for their own sakes (101-16).

The third supplement (chapter 6) consists of a detailed description of how it is that moral agents do things that they do not want to do, or that they know they ought not to do. An important class of actions in this category are those of moral weakness, or *akrasia*. Sokolowski's analysis here avoids the nitpicking details of recent articles on the logic of *akrasia*, and helpfully focuses on the contrast between the self-controlled man (*enkrates*) and the akratic man (*akratus*). The self-controlled man is not the best man, for as Aristotle points out, the best man does virtuous actions with ease and pleasure. The self-controlled man does the virtuous things for the right reasons, but not without a hard struggle with his inclinations. The akratic man is simply a self-controlled man with gaps in his self-control. The flaw in the akratic man is not a flaw in rationality, but is instead simply a character flaw: he is simply too weak to stick to his good moral judgments.

The last part of the book (chapter 7) is a sustained ontological reflection on the previous themes. There is an 'ontological difference' between the good itself and the many things that are good (144): we see here how G.E. Moore and Heidegger might be treated in parallel. The things that are good may be confused with other things that appear to be good but are not; this makes possible the distinction between things that are merely desirable as opposed to those that are actually good. The difference between the desirable and the good is a primordial distinction underlying all moral phenomena. Because things may be supposed and desired as good when they are not in fact good, our moral judgments may be true or false. The difference between the supposed good and the actual good corresponds to Husserl's distinction between empty and filled intentions.

As can be seen, Sokolowski's account is both comprehensive and compelling. There are, however, three points on which one might raise objections. (1) A moral act is defined by Sokolowski such that it requires an actual or possible material performance as a necessary condition. But what about refrainings and omissions? These seem to be authentic moral acts, yet they involve no material performances. (2) Is it true that acts are *moral* only if done for their own sakes? Or is it rather the case that actions are morally *good* only if done for their own sakes? If the former were true, then many or most of

the acts we call morally bad — acts done from self-interested motives — would turn out to be *non-moral*. (3) Are deontology and consequentialism so easily argued away? It seems obvious that they are flawed in various ways, but their very presence behind many of our day-to-day moral intuitions and institutions suggests that they possess *some* moral tenure. Recent discussions of these issues by J. Rawls, T. Nagel, B. Williams, and P. Foot suggest that deontology and consequentialism have a deeper significance than Sokolowski seems prepared to admit.

Despite these niggling criticisms, it must be said that *Moral Action* is a brilliant application of phenomenological concepts to moral experience. Phenomenology has unfortunately been sparing of works in moral philosophy — only books by M. Scheler and M. Mandelbaum come to mind — and *Moral Action* seems bound to improve phenomenology's reputation greatly in this important field.

ROBERT HANNA
Yale University

R.C. STALNAKER. *Inquiry*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Bradford Books) 1984.
Pp. xii + 187. US\$19.95. ISBN 0-262-19233-0.

This excellent, demanding and rewarding book is written in a refreshingly simple and approachable style, particularly considering the technicality of much of the material that Stalnaker is handling; a large amount is achieved in a small compass. Stalnaker draws together strands from his published articles, with additions. His main topic is the formal nature of inquiry: the representation of propositions and the propositional attitudes of an inquirer. In the first two chapters he is concerned to argue on 'pragmatic,' i.e. broadly functionalist, grounds against any account of propositions that conceives of them as linguistic items or on any analogy with linguistic items, and to defend a familiar account of propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values, drawing a sharp distinction between propositions and the means we choose to express them. He goes on to consider ways in which this account affects or even resolves thorny questions in the philosophy of mind, e.g. whether animals and infants have beliefs; and, with less success but most commendable honesty, to try to extricate it from apparent difficulties.

Stalnaker seeks to distinguish his views from those of David Lewis, both in terms of the formal semantic analysis of conditionals and in terms of the

proper degree of realism about possible worlds and counterfactuals. Lewis is presented as an extreme realist both about possible worlds and about counterfactuals. The first is for familiar reasons, the second because of Lewis' tendency towards a Humean reduction of the truth of counterfactuals to facts concerning similarities between worlds and of scientific laws to regularities. Stalnaker aims for a moderate position on both fronts. He rejects Lewis' full-blooded realism for possible worlds; worlds are not to be thought of as other objects just like this one — 'I and all my surroundings' — since there is only one object of this sort. Possible worlds are, however, different ways this world might have been. Semantics, it seems, requires us to accept the existence of possible worlds in this sense, but does not therefore require us to go all the way with Lewis' metaphysics. Stalnaker's position is both complicated and distinctive because of this distinction between semantics and metaphysics, which occurs repeatedly. He holds that we require an apparatus of possible worlds in order to represent the mental states of inquirers; a belief state is to be represented as a set of possible worlds (intuitively, all worlds not ruled out by the propositions believed), and an individual belief is a property of such a set, namely the porperty that the proposition believed is true in every member of the set. But this apparatus has no consequences for metaphysics. For Stalnaker, the notion of a possible world is a formal or functional notion like that of an individual, required of us by semantics but as yet compatible with several different sorts of metaphysics, in particular with different degrees of realism.

Modest realism here holds that 'the only possible worlds there are are elements of our actual world, not concrete objects or situations, but abstract objects whose existence is inferred from the activities of rational agents' (50-1). Given that this thesis is supposed to be devoid of metaphysical implications, and of psychological ones since the propositions represented are firmly distinguished from the form such representation might take, it is not clear what content it does have. Stalnaker is sensitive to this charge (57), but I can't really see what answer he has to it. Perhaps his real point is that it doesn't really matter whether it is realism or not; the focus of the debate about realism then shifts to the question of realism about counterfactuals.

Here Stalnaker's modest realism is the doctrine that counterfactuals are true in virtue of facts about the actual world, distinguished from but compatible with the semantic doctrine that a counterfactual is true in virtue of the truth of the consequent in some different possible situation (163). Two stronger forms of realism are rejected. One, naive realism, holds that counterfactuals are able to be barely true; Stalnaker argues convincingly against Dummett that the realist is not committed to bare truth. The other, reductionism, holds that the truth of counterfactuals reduces to the truth of non-modal facts — in Lewis' case, facts about several worlds.

Three strands contribute to Stalnaker's modest realism. The first is his belief that there are conditional propositions, which he defends against the complaint that conditionals are too context-dependent to express genuine propositions, by holding that context-dependence is a feature of the means we

use to express propositions. The propositions themselves, once suitably expressed, can be determinately true or false independent of context. However he admits a deeper sense in which conditionals are context-dependent, which is that the framework of possible worlds and selection functions arises from certain human concerns and activities. This is compatible, in Stalnaker's view, with a reasonable realism. 'However we arrive at the concepts we use to describe the world, so long as there is something in the world in virtue of which our descriptions are true or false, the realist will be vindicated' (152-3).

Not only is it the case that the framework of possible worlds arises from human concerns, but also the existence of conditional propositions can only be explained by use of a general 'projection strategy' which 'assumes that natural necessities should be explained as projections of epistemic principles and practices onto the world' (103). This is perhaps the main conceptual underpinning of the whole book, but it looks initially very unpromising as a basis for any sort of realism, however 'reasonable.' Stalnaker argues, however, that this strategy is only successful in a rather incomplete way. Some conditional questions have to be regarded as questions about the (conditional) facts rather than about how to change one's beliefs in response to new information. In the face of this Stalnaker seeks to preserve the projection strategy by suggesting that we might still be able to explain the acceptance of conditional propositions as a rational disposition to change one's belief in the light of new information, if we consider the matter in relation to idealised contexts which abstract away from those aspects of our epistemic situation which derive more from our parochial perspective and less from the way we take the world to be (116). I comment on this position below.

The third strand in modest realism is the thought that counterfactuals must be seen as made true by (true in virtue of) the way this world is, for only thus can we make sense of the fact that we can be justified in counterfactual beliefs. They are made true in this way, but their truth does not reduce to the truth of the propositions that make them true. It outruns this truth, just as supervenient facts outrun the facts on which they supervene; they say things that couldn't be said in the subvenient vocabulary. Stalnaker wrongly thinks of supervenience as a weapon in the hands of the reductionist, since he takes it that subvenient facts determine supervenient ones. This is a mistake in ethics, and it is a mistake here as well. Supervenience, if it works at all, offers us a sense in which subvenient and supervenient facts cannot come apart, without its being the case that the subvenient facts 'fix' the supervenient ones in the particular case in any way that leads to a reduction. Thinking he has to find something wrong with supervenience, Stalnaker argues that there is no possibility of finding an autonomous class of subvenient statements. But his position here is not easily compatible with the way he defends the projection strategy by supposing that we can draw a distinction between those aspects of our epistemic strategies which can be ascribed to our parochial perspective and those which are somehow disentaglable from our own peculiarities.

Stalnaker's position here is modest enough, but is it realism? It really is very hard to see as realist a position which insists on explaining the possibility of

conditional propositions by appeal, however limited, to our epistemic practices and principles. On his own showing, this appeal only works with the help of a dubious disentangling device; he also takes the existence of semantic indeterminacy to be a problem, though in doing so he forgets his own distinction between semantics and metaphysics. But, more crucially, the very direction of explanation here is wrong. Stalnaker writes that conditional facts are identified by the methodological policies that they might justify; this is a realist position, but it is hard to see then how the policies may serve to explain the facts. If it is possible to keep projectivism and realism together, Stalnaker has not shown us how to do it.

I have focused on only one aspect of this important book, which repays careful study. Perhaps its greatest strength is that it discovers in what is initially a purely formal approach a surprising depth and richness.

JONATHAN DANCY
University of Keele